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Symposium On Administrative Law

Symposium on Administrative Law
TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THERE BE FORMULATED RULES WITH RESPECT TO
WHAT CONSTITUTES A FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING, WHICH ARE GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO DIFFERENT ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND TO
DIFFERENT KINDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION?

RALPH F. FUCHS
Professor of Lawv, Washington University

M ofR. the
President,
Members
I suspect
and Guests
that
Association:
the selection by the Executive Committee
of this topic 'for discussion this afternoon is indicative of a change in emphasis in the field of public law which it
seems to me has occurred during the past
few years. The great questions of public law-only three or four short years ago
had to do with the scope of legislative
power, with the scope of the power of
state legislatures and of Congress to
regulate industry in such matters as price
fixing, with the scope of the commerce
power and of the taxing power wielded
by Congress. But those questions, for
the time being at least, seem largely to
have been settled.
With Nebbia v. New York, 54 S.Ct.
505, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469, the
power of legislatures to engage in price
fixing in fields where theretofore it had
been thought impossible was established
with reasonable firmness. With West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703, 108 A.L.R.
1330, the power of legislatures to establish minimum wages for women seems
to have been conceded with rather definite effect. The National Labor Relations cases have so materially broadened
the scope of the commerce power as to
open up to Congress areas of regulation
which seem reasonably adequate to the
needs of the present situation. Similarly, the Social Security Act cases and
others have removed from the field of
immediate difficulty the outstanding constitutional obstacles to legislative regula-

tion which existed until a short time
ago.
There are, of course, plenty of questions remaining. There still exist on
each important constitutional issue two
lines of cases, the liberal and the strict.
They are there to be invoked, either for
the enlargement or for the restriction of
legislative power in the future. Federal incorporation of corporations engaged in business will give rise to constitutional litigation. The Fair Labor
Standards Act will have to be passed
upon before we can be sure that it is
within the power of Congress. But, by
and large, we can now look at public
law with some assurance that the Constitution has been made flexible enough
and broad enough to permit of the necessary legislative efforts.
The emphasis, therefore, in public law
has shifted in recent months to questions of administrative procedure. The
landmark cases that make the front pages
as the Supreme Court decides them these
days have to do with notice and hearing
and the right to be confronted with the
evidence against one in an administrative proceeding. The case which has
most recently brought to the fore public interest in administrative procedure
is the famous Morgan case [Morgan v.
U. S.], 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 999,
82 L.Ed. 1129, decided just last year
by the Supreme Court. Before that, the
Panama Refining case [Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan], 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct.
241, 79 L.Ed. 446, for the first time
brought to the attention of the public
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and of administrators the doctrine that
findings of fact must accompany executive regulations which operate with penal
effect, if those regulations are to be held
constitutional under the due process
clause. With these procedural questions, going to the very root of administrative effectiveness, being dealt with
by the Supreme Court in landmark cases,
we have had general public interest, almost an unbelievable public interest, in
fairly technical questions of administrative procedure; and it is those questions
which we are confronted with here this
afternoon.
It is perhaps worthy of note, also, that
within the field of administrative law
itself there has been a shift of emphasis
during the past two or three years. The
cases I have just mentioned deal with
administrative procedure. Before that,
the most prominent administrative law
decisions were those that dealt with the
scope of judicial review. The great
question was how far the courts should
control administrative agencies in the
exercise of their regulatory powers.
Back in 1920, we had the case of Ohio
Valley Water Company v. Ben Avon
Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 S.Ct. 527,
64 L.Ed. 908. In 1932, we had the case
of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52
S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598, and in 1937,
the St. Joseph Stockyards case [St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U. S.], 298 U.
S. 38, 56 S.Ct. 720, 80 L.Ed. 1033, all
of which enlarged the previously prevailing conceptions of the length to which
the courts might go in reviewing administrative orders, particularly in the field
of public utility rate fixing.
The issues which those cases raise, and
which have been dealt with in numerous
other cases as well, still remain unsettled.
We don't know, with finality or certainty, what the scope of judicial review
should be and will be in public utility
rate fixing or in other fields of administration, but the questions which concern us now and which are before us
this afternoon are the cases dealing not
with judicial review but with the procedure in the first instance of administrative agencies themselves.

Each of the recent cases dealing with
administrative procedure, I mean the
landmark cases which .1 mentioned, laid
down broad propositions whose application to administrative procedure was
very difficult to determine. In the Panama Refining case, the opinion gave little
guidance as to just how wide an area
of executive regulation was subject to
the requirement that regulations be accompanied by findings as a condition of
their validity. In the Morgan case the
Supreme Court again left very much
in doubt the question of how far the requirement of the case, which purported
to be merely the interpretation of a statute but which had distinct constitutional
implications, extended over other fields
of administration. The case itself, of
course, involved the Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 181 et seq.; but
the court, as the newspapers quickly
brought out, spoke of the basic requirements of fair play in administrative procedure generally and asserted that the
decision in an administrative proceeding
must be by the official who heard the
parties, or else that the official who conducted the hearing must make an interim
report to" the deciding official, with opportunity for argument by those affected by the proceedings. That requirement was put forth by the court in such
a way as to make it seem that it had
much wider application than merely in
the administration of the Packers and
Stockyards Act.
Those decisions, with their extremely
broad implications and their evident reliance upon constitutional doctrine, even
though in the Morgan case there happened to be simply the interpretation of
a statute involved, threw the administrative world in Washington into a great
deal of uncertainty and confusion. Each
of these cases was followed by an offsetting one. The Panama Refining case
was followed by Pacific States Box and
Basket Company v. White, 296 U.S. 176,
56 S.Ct. 159, 80 L.Ed. 138, 101 A.L.R.
853, in which the court did not apply
the proposition that there must be findings accompanying an executive regulation to the regulations of a state de-
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partment of agriculture governing the
sizes and shapes of containers for strawberries and raspberries, saying they were
not the same type of regulations which
the Panama case involved. The differences, however, are a bit difficult to discern, since both regulations affected
numerous business enterprises and both
of them operated with penal effect. Thus
the offsetting case, while it lent assurance
that strict procedural requirements would
not necessarily be applied over the entire field of administration, still left widespread the doubt into which the original
decision had thrown the administrative
world.
The Morgan case has been followed
by the Mackay Radio and Telegraph
case [National Labor Relations Board v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.], 304
U.S. 333, 58 S.Ct. 904, 82 L.Ed. 1381,
at the last term of court, in which the
court did not apply the propositions of
the Morgan case to a proceeding before
the National Labor Relations Board,
upon the ground that, in that case, the
issues the respondent was having to meet
had been sufficiently defined by the
Board and that, therefore, some of the
procedural safeguards insisted upon in
the Morgan case need not be applied.
But again, the precise extent of the application of the doctrine of the Morgan
,case remains in doubt; and administrators are searching, apparently, for criteria whereby they can determine what
procedures are constitutionally necessary
in the first place, and what procedures
are desirable and effective in the second
place, in the administration of the acts
which are entrusted to them to carry out.
Practicing lawyers who must appear
before administrative commissions likewise seem to be searching for, criteria of
what constitutional issues they can properly raise in cases which they present in
behalf of their clients. Law teachers,
scholars in the field of law, presumably
are searching also for criteria which
will aid them both in teaching and in
public discussion of the problems of administrative law-criteria which will assist them to lay out the field in an understandable manner.

The actual determination of administrative procedure takes place, of course,
in three stages, the stage of statutory
drafting, the stage in which the administrative agency within statutory limits
determines its own procedure, and the
stage in which a court, upon judicial review, has an opportunity to pass upon
procedure that has been adopted and,
expressly or by inference, to lay down
requirements for future administrative
procedure.
At all these stages in the determination
of administrative procedure the central
question is, or ought to be, what procedure will be most conducive to the successful performance of the particular administrative function for which the procedure is being devised, having in mind,
also, due protection to affected private
interests. That question must remain a
specific one. It is a question which in
each instance bears directly upon the
procedure of a particular administrative
agency. The approach of the legislator,
of the administrator and of the judge,
must be an approach which is specific,
which centers upon the problem immediately confronting the official, in whatever branch of the government he may
happen' to be. But in searching for
guidance as to what to do, it is not only
the prattical considerations arising in the
particular field but possibly also categories and analogies that may be established by study of the problems of procedure that can be made a reliance in
the framing of new administrative procedures.
That is where the group of law teachers enters the picture. If we have a
function in connection with the devising..
of administrative procedures, it is the
function of investigation followed by the
establishment of categories which will be
of assistance to officials in the devising
of new procedures. Neither legislators
nor judges nor administrators have the
time or the facilities to engage in the
research and in the thought which might
lead to the establishment of the categories that would be useful to them.
So I suggest that, in the course of this
discussion this afternoon, we remain
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conscious of the approach which the
particular speaker is making. He may
be making the approach of the official
who is concerned with the problems of
the particular agency with which he is
dealing and who does not purport to
draw generalizations in regard to administrative procedure as a whole. The
value of his material for law teachers,
as such, lies largely in the contribution
which the data make to the consideration
of the general problem. If the speaker,
on the other hand, is endeavoring to
draw generalizations from data, then he
speaks in the capacity which most of us
occupy.
It is a question, of course, whether administrative procedure can be treated in
a generalized manner. It is possible that
generalizations may simply obscure the
difficulty rather than help in the solution
of problems. If each administrative
agency is so unique that its problems cannot fruitfully be considered in connection
with the problems of other agencies and
in connection with categories of procedure that may be established, then the
effort of scholars to establish categories
must necessarily fail. But I believe that
that is not the situation. It seems to
me that adequate analysis necessarily reveals that it is possible to examine administration, to consider the problems of
procedure, and to establish categories
and suggestions which are realistic and
fruitful in the solution of particular
problems as they arise.
I should like, before closing, to suggest a few considerations that seem to
me to bear upon the problem of establishing categories for administrative procedure with which we are confronted at
the present time.
In the first place, I think it is clear
that the attempt to establish a significant
classification of administrative functions
on the basis of the theory of the separation of powers has definitely failed. It
is impossible to define three functions of
government which correspond to the
three aggregates of powers that have
been conferred upon the three departments of government. The attempt to.

say that administrative functions are
quasi-legislative on the one hand, quasijudicial on the other, and that procedure
can be framed which is suitable for those
two categories, considered more or less
distinct from each other, is leading to
increased confusion rather than to the
solution of our problems. We meet, for
example, with the oft-repeated proposition that rate fixing is a quasi-legislative
proceeding in which quasi-judicial methods are employed. Such a proposition is
not helpful in the solution of practical
problems. It has led recently to a decision in a United States District Court,
although only a tentative one in the
course of the granting of a temporary injunction, that a minimum wage order applicable over an entire state and to,
numerous occupations within the state
is an order which must be formulated by
means of the strict procedure contemplated in the Morgan case. Now, when
you consider the nature of the problem
confronting a state board in laying down
a minimum wage of such extensive application, it seems to me that you must
concede that the very careful quasi-judicial type of procedure which the Morgan case contemplates is necessarily inapplicable. You cannot grant to every
party affected by such an order the type
of hearing which the court, in the Morgan case, had in mind. You cannot
frame the issues with sufficient definiteness. Certainly you cannot isolate a sufficiently small number of issues so that
the evidence may bear directly upon each
of them and be subject to successful
handling in this quasi-judicial manner.
In the second place, I think we will
have to consider it as established that
the gathering of data through intensive
study of particular administrative agencies is going to continue to be the most
definite and fruitful method of enriching the study of administrative law. Inx
the work that has been done along these
lines we have our principal body of information for devising more realistic
administration procedures. The studies
of Henderson and Sharfman and Patterson and Dodd in different fields of ad-
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ministration give us what we have in the
way of information upon which to go.
We need more of that kind of work, and
we are not going to progress far in solving the problems of administrative procedure unless we do get more.
But, after the data have been gathered,
it is still necessary to discern common
elements in the functioning of different
administrative agencies and to lay down
criteria which are useful for procedural
purposes on the basis of those common
elements. And I believe it is possible
to analyze administrative processes in
such a way as to make generalizations
possible which incorporate the results
of the study of particular administrative
agencies.
An administrative investigation which
must precede the issuance of an administrative order of some kind is certain to
have the elements which any investigation must have, namely, in the first place,
the formulation of questions involved in
the problem that is to be taken up; second, the receiving and considering of evidence bearing upon those questions;
thirdly, arriving at conclusions, or findings if you will, in regard to those questions involved in the problem; and, lastly, the reaching of the answer to the
problem in terms of the findings that
have been made and in the light either of
the provisions of a statute or of administrative discretion exercised within the
limits fixed by statute. That is to say,
we can assert that in administrative investigations there must be the definition
of the issues; there must be the reception of evidence.; there must be the
formulation, if not explicitly then by
implication, of conclusions in regard to
those issues; there must be a decision;
and that decision may be either a decision of law or a decision which is discretionary, within limits defined by law.
If that is true of administrative investigations generally, then we are some distance along the road to fruitful generalization.
In considering what procedures are
most useful and best adapted to carrying fdrward these several steps in any
particular administrative proceeding, I

believe there are certain other factors
that we can well keep in mind and which
may be the basis of more particular rules
that still have a wider application than a
single administrative agency.
In the first place, we do distinguish
and need to distinguish between regulatory administrative functions and the
non-regulatory; the regulatory which
bear directly on some particular interest,
usually of a private nature, and the nonregulatory which have to do largely with
the administration of the government,
the Army regulations, for example.
In the second place, if you have a
regulatory function, sometimes the proceeding will affect many parties, sometimes only a few. The procedure which
is adapted to the investigation is necessarily going to vary with the number of
parties affected. You can't grant as
careful a hearing when there are many
as when there are only a few. Furthermore, you often cannot get many parties represented before an administrative agency which is passing upon a general problem. Representation of the affected parties has got to be taken care
of by other means than their own appearance or the appearance of counsel in
their behalf.
In the third place, I think that we
must give attention to the nature of the
problems which are involved in different types of administrative proceedings.
You have problems which involve public health and safety, for example, which
are quite different in the procedures
they call for, from problems of economic
control.
Within any particular field of administration there are different types of determinations to be made. If you take the
recent Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
21 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq., for example,
you can see in the rule-making power of
the Secretary of Agriculture, conferred
by that Act, at least three classes of questions with which the administration has
to deal. There are questions of scientific
determination such as the amount of
spray residue, poisonous spray residue,
which can be permitted on fresh fruit
without harm to consumers-a strictly
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scientific problem, which calls for a different procedure of investigation from
the problem, for example, of determining what is the minimum acceptable
standard for canned peaches, because
there the standard is not a standard affecting health and safety but a standard
of quality involving the judgment of consumers and the custom of the trade with
regard to the matter in hand. The type
of investigation needed in that kind of
administrative rule-making is quite different from that which is adapted to determining a scientific question. The
third kind of question which the Secretary has to determine under the Act is
the psychological effect, for example, of
labels on food and drug productswhether certain sizes of type, whether
certain wordings, will effectively produce the desired impression upon the
mind of consumers, or not.
We have also to consider, in arriving
at generalizations in regard to administrative procedure, such questions as the
nature of the sanctions which are going
to be applied in order to enforce an administrative order. If the sanctions are
penal, as the Supreme Court recognized
in the Panama Refining case, then in all
probability greater care in procedure is
called for than if the sanctions are other
than penal. But, of course, the deprivation of a license upon which the livelihood of an individual or the financial
solvency of a corporation depends is an
equally drastic sanction.

If we take these several elements
which bear upon suitable procedure, and
if we have them in mind as we examine
the data growing out of study of particular administrative agencies, then I
think it is possible that, as scholars, we
can contribute to the solution of our
administrative problems generalizations
which will be at once realistic and yet
broad enough to furnish effective guidance. I believe also that we should be
acutely conscious as we consider the task
confronting us, that upon its successful
performance there may turn the continued existence of our capitalist democra-.
cy, if one may call it that. It is through
administrative control that this country
today is seeking to preserve the system
that it has. If that control works efficiently, if it results in the satisfaction of
those human demands which are made
upon our economic and political system, then our capitalist democracy may
endure. But if the administrative system is tied up with procedural handicaps,
if it is prevented from functioning efficiently by the poor performance of the
procedural tasks, then the system may
break down. It is the legal profession,
it is the law teachers, to whom falls the
task of devising suitable procedures; for
lawyers have been, from the beginning,
the experts whom society has provided,
whose services it has employed, in solving the problems of procedure where
government bears upon group and private interests.

J. WARREN MADDEN
Chairman, National Labor Relations Board
I President Arant, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Association, and your Guests:
Coming as I do, from an atmosphere
which, upon occasions, is something less
than calm and philosophical and contemplative, I think I can appreciate more
than I ever did before the mastery which
teachers have an opportunity to acquire
and do acquire over subjects, by their
academic study and observation of them,
which is quite impossible to the people.
who are in the midst of them.

So, this fine introduction, showing as
it does the understanding of the generalizations which do or may run through
administrative process, has struck in me,
particularly, admiration.
The enforcement of legislation through
administrative procedures has two primary aims. One is to place the initial
enforcement proceedings in the hands of
a body of experts sympathetic with the
purposes of the statute and possessing
the specialized knowledge essential to an
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adequate handling of the complex problems with which much of our present
day legislation deals. The other is to
achieve a more rapid and more efficient
disposition of the numerous controversies bound to arise out of almost any
piece of legislation dealing with our more
serious problems. The administrative
process has developed in response to the
inevitable extension of government regulation designed to bring some order into
the increasing complexities of modern
economic society. I think it cannot be
doubted that some such procedure is vital if the techniques of government are
to keep pace with the development of our
economic, social and political life.
The National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., well illustrates
the field in which administrative procedures are essential to the successful operation of legislation. The problems of
labor relations are delicate and complex.
Prosecuting and judicial agencies in existence at the passage of the Act were in
general ill equipped by training or experience to deal with problems arising in
this field. At the same time the need for
speed and dispatch is urgent. A labor
situation does not remain in statu quo
for long. It is likely either to develop
rapidly into an explosion or to subside
quickly into nothing. In short if the
rights of workers to self-organization
and collective bargaining are to be preserved, it must be done through machinery that is directed by experts and designed for swift and efficient disposition
of controversies. The fate of Section 7
(a) of the National Industrial Recovery
Act-the enforcement of which was attempted through non-administrative procedure-adequately points the lesson in
this respect.
At the same time there is much concern expressed today over the expansion
of the administrative process in the field
of governmental regulation. Without
doubt a good deal of this concern is based
upon opposition to the regulation itself
rather than the method of its enforcement; and the propaganda of those with
this point of view is unquestionably responsible for even more of the fears that
10

have been expressed over the rapid development of the administrative process.
Nevertheless it must be admitted that the
establishment of general safeguards, to
be administered by the judiciary where
necessary, is vital to the preservation of
the democratic process. These safeguards must not be so restrictive, or applied with such disregard for the problems to be solved, that they jeopardize
legitimate methods or objectives of the
administrative process. The unintelligent, or unsympathetic, application of
general procedural restrictions could
readily cripple and destroy the functioning of almost any administrative agency.
On the other hand the safeguards should
be sufficient to guarantee against abuse
of the administrative process.
Fundamental to any such check upon
the administrative process is the requirement of a "fair hearing." I agree with
Professor Fuchs that the question whether general rules can be laid down to
guarantee a fair hearing must be approached first through a consideration of
the specific procedures of specific administrative agencies. I will endeavor, therefore, to outline briefly the procedure of
the National Labor Relations Board and
then to consider certain problems of fair
hearing which have been raised by our
experience in administration thus far.
Under the National Labor Relations
Act, the National Labor Relations Board
has two general functions, the administration of each of which has a procedure
somewhat different from the other.
First the Act guarantees to employees
the right of freedom in self-organization
and the right of collective bargaining
with their employer. Interference with
the right of self-organization by employers, and the refusal by an employer to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, are unfair labor
practices. Where an employer has engaged or is engaging in unfair labor
practices the Board is empowered to prevent their recurrence and to require affirmative action necessary to restore the
status quo. Secondly, the Act sets up
machinery by which the Board may determine who has been selected as the rep-
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resentative of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit and who, therefore, has exclusive rights of collective
bargaining with the employer.
The Board administers the Act through
a staff at Washington and through twenty-two regional offices throughout the
country. Each regional office consists of
a Regional Director, with his assistants,
and a Regional Attorney, with subordinate attorneys. I will consider first the
Board's procedure with respect to its
functions of preventing and remedying
unfair labor practices.
Upon the filing of a charge that a violation of the Act has occurred, the regional office sends an agent to investigate. If the charge seems justified, the
Regional Director or his agent attempts
to obtain an adjustment through voluntary compliance with the Act. As in the
case of most other statutes, the great majority of the cases are adjusted in this
manner without resort to formal legal
proceedings. Throughout the period of
its existence thus far, a little over three
years, the Board had handled a total of
more than 18,000 cases. Of these, 14,000 cases, or over three quarters, have
been closed, and of the cases closed more
than 95 per cent were closed by voluntary adjustment. Thus only 5 per cent involved the necessity of a hearing or other formal action under the Act.
Where it is impossible to secure an adjustment and the facts seem to point to
a violation of the Act the Regional Director issues and serves upon the employer a complaint setting forth the facts
upon which the Board bases its jurisdiction and the alleged facts relating to the
unfair labor practices. Accompanying
the complaint is a notice of a hearing before a trial examiner designated by the
Board. The trial examiner, it should be
noted, is appointed by the Chief Trial
Examiner who is responsible to the Secretary of the Board and who is not a
part of the Legal Division.
At the hearing the Board's attorney
presents the evidence in support of the
complaint. An attorney for the labor
organization involved is often present
and may likewise participate. The re-

spondent may of course appear through
its attorney and offer evidence in its defence. Under the Act the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling. Nevertheless
the hearing in general is conducted in accordance with the usual rules of evidence
and departures therefrom are permitted
by the trial examiner only where adequate reason is shown.
At the conclusion of the hearing the
trial examiner normally issues a so-called
Intermediate Report containing his findings as to the facts and his recommendations as to relief. The Intermediate Report is served on the parties to the proceeding, who are notified that exceptions
and requests for oral argument or briefs
should be filed with the Board within a
stated period. If exceptions to the Intermediate Report are filed or if the recommendations of the trial examiner are
not complied with, the case comes before
the Board for decision. In a few cases
the Board transfers the case to itself immediately after hearing without an Intermediate Report from the trial examiner. In such instances the Board, prior to
issuing a final decision, issues proposed
findings of fact, proposed conclusions of
law and a proposed order, to which the
parties may file exceptions and request
oral argument or briefs in the same manner as in the case of an Intermediate Report.
Oral argument is heard before the
Board itself in Washington whenever requested by any of the parties or, occasionally, upon request of the Board itself. Briefs are always accepted and
considered upon the request of any of
the parties or likewise occasidnally upon
request of the Board.
The case is now ready for decision by
the Board. Despite the relatively small
number of cases which go to hearing, the
absolute number of cases which come
before the Board for decision is large.
During the past three years the Board
has issued some 1,200 decisions. At the
present time there are several hundred
cases pending before the Board for decision. The average record in each case is
well over 1,000 pages. It can readily be
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seen from these figures that the Board
members themselves cannot expect to
read the records. In making its decisions the Board therefore avails itself of
assistants known as review attorneys who
are under the direction of an Assistant
General Counsel and a group of supervisors. The review attorneys analyze
the evidence, inform the Board of the
contentions of all parties and the testimony relating thereto, and make initial
drafts of the Board's findings and order.
In every case the Board's decision contains findings of fact and an order either
dismissing the complaint or requiring the
respondent to cease and desist from its
unfair labor practices and to take certain
affirmative action to restore the status
quo and effectuate the purposes of the
Act. The order of the Board is not selfenforceable. If the respondent does not
comply with the Board's order it is necessary for the Board to petition the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals for
enforcement. The respondent may likewise petition a Circuit Court for review
of the Board's order. On any review in
the circuit court the Board's findings of
fact, if supported by evidence, are conclusive. The Court has of course full
leeway to consider and decide questions
of law. Among the questions of law
properly before the Court is the question
whether the Board's procedure has been
proper and whether a fair hearing has
been accorded the respondent under the
Act and under the due process clause of
the Constitution.
The procedure for the certification of
representatives follows a somewhat similar pattern. Upon the filing of a petition
for certification, the Board's agent investigates and, if it appears that a question
concerning representation has arisen, attempts to secure adjustment through an
informal check of union membership,
through a consent election, or through
other similar informal proceedings.
Where such adjustment is impossible the
Board, upon recommendation of its Regional Director, authorizes an investigation. The Regional Director issues a notice of hearing which is served upon the
employer involved, upon the labor or-

ganization filing the petition and upon
any other labor organizations known to
the Regional Director to be claiming
members among the employees involved.
A hearing is held before a trial examiner. In these cases no complaint is issued
and the role of the Board's attorney is
one of an investigator rather than prosecutor. In general if the labor organizations involved are represented by counsel, the primary burden of establishing
the case is left to such counsel.
Upon the conclusion of the hearing
the trial examiner does not submit an Intermediate Report. He issues an informal report for the guidance of the Board
alone. The Board then, with the assistance of a review attorney, makes its decision. It may either dismiss the petition, may certify representatives upon
the basis of the record, or may direct an
election. In the latter event the election
is held tinder the supervision of the Regional Director.
The method of conducting eleGtions
cannot be considered in detail at this
time. In general it may be said that the
election is supervised directly by an agent
of the Board but that representatives of
interested labor organizations are entitled to participate as observers and under normal circumstances an agent of the
employer is likewise permitted to participate.
Following the ballot the Regional Director issues his Intermediate Report
containing his conclusions as to the results of the election. Any of the parties, including the employer, has the opportunity to file objections to this Intermediate Report. If no objections are
filed, the Regional Director submits the
report to the Board and the Board thereupon certifies representatives, or if no
representative has been chosen, dismisses
the proceeding. If objections are filed to
the report of the Regional Director but
the objections do not raise any substantial or material issue the Board proceeds
in the same manner as if no objections
were filed. If the Regional Director considers that the objections do raise a substantial or material issue, he serves further notice on the parties to appear be-
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fore a trial examiner in support of their
objections. In such cases the trial examiner takes testimony but again does not
render any Intermediate Report. The
record of the testimony is transferred to
the Board for decision and the Board, on
the basis of the record of the hearing
and the Regional Director's Intermediate
Report, makes its decision either dismissing the petition or certifying representatives or taking such other action as seems
necessary.
A certification of representatives has
no enforceable effect. It is merely evidence of a right to representation. The
employer is not bound by the decision nor
is any order issued against the employer.
Consequently there is no direct review in
the courts of the Board's certification of
representatives. If, however, the employer refuses to bargain collectively
with the representatives certified by the
Board, and the Board thereupon brings
an unfair labor practice proceeding
agaiist the employer based upon such refusal, the employer may obtain a review
in the courts, not only of the record in
the unfair labor practice proceeding but
also of the record in the prior certification proceeding.
It will be seen from the foregoing that
the Board is not endowed with law making functions. Under the Act the Board's
powers are limited to the initial adjudication of controversies involving individual employers charged with violation of
law, and to the investigation and certification of facts relating to the represeniation of employees. The problems of
fair hearing with which the Board is concerned have therefore been confined to
these two types of administrative action.
During the three years of its existence
the Board has had ample opportunity to
consider certain major problems of fair
hearing. It need hardly be said that
counsel for employers have not been reticent in urging upon the Board and upon
the courts alleged deficiencies in the
Board's procedure. Consequently it may
be assumed that in the three years of operation thus far our attention has been
directed to most of the important questions of fair hearing which are likely to

affect employers appearing before the
Board. The same applies, perhaps to a
somewhat lesser degree, to our procedure
as it affects the rights of labor organization.
First to be noted are various matters
which relate to questions of pleading.
To what extent must the complaint recite
in detail the alleged unfair labor practices? Under what circumstances is the
respondent entitled to a bill of particulars? To what degree can the Board's
attorney amend the complaint during the
course of the hearing? If such an
amendment is made what notice is the
respondent entitled to for the purpose of
answering and preparing its defense?
To what extent is a variance between
pleadings and proof fatal to the validity
of the Board's order? To what extent
may the Board adopt a theory of the
case different from that alleged in the
complaint or pursued by the Board's attorney at the hearing?
Problems of this sort have been particularly acute during these first years of
the Board's operations. The legislation is
new. That body of specific interpretation and application of the more general
provisions of the Act-which grows up
around every statute-takes years to
work out. As time goes on, and as the
scope and implications of the Act become
clear, there will undoubtedly be less difficulty with pleading questions of this
sort.
However, even at the-initial stages of
the Board's operations, it seems to me
feasible to set up general rules of guidance which, if intelligently and sympathetically applied by the courts, should
assure the respondent in each case adequate protection on issues of pleading.
A good illustration of such general principles is furnished by the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in
National Labor Relations Board v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.
S. 333, 58 S.Ct. 904, 82 L.Ed. 1381. The
facts in the case were these:
After a period of unsuccessful negotiation between a labor organization
known as the American Radio Telegraphists Association and the Mackay
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Radio and Telegraph Company, the union ordered a strike of its members for
the purpose of enforcing its demands upon the compan.y. The strike was nationwide but the facts before the Board pertained only to the company's San Francisco office. There the strike soon proved unsuccessful and after several days
the employees reported back for work.
The company put most of the strikers
back to work but refused to take back
certain of the more active union leaders.
The Board issued a complaint alleging
that the respondent had "discharged and
refused to employ" the five men who
were not reinstated for the reason that
they had joined and assisted a labor organization, and that by such discharge
the respondent had discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of such employees contrary to Section 8 (1) and (3) of the Act. After
completion of its testimony the Board's
attorney filed an amended complaint to
conform with the evidence in which it
was alleged that the respondent had "reftised to re-employ' the five men in question for the reason that they had joined
and assisted a labor organization, and
that such refusal of reemployment constituted discrimination in regard to hire
and tenure of employment contrary to
Section 8 (1) and (3) of the Act. The
respondent entered a general denial of
the amended complaint and then presented its evidence. The Board found
that the respondent refused to reinstate
to employment the five men, "thereby
discharging said employees," and by such
acts discriminated in regard to tenure of
employment contrary to Section 8 (1)
and (3) of the Act.
I may interject here that, when I read
this variety of words and then look down
and see Professor Cook, who taught me
common law pleading, sitting right here
before me, it does bring back old times
and make me wonder whether we are going to go through the kind of evolutions
which took place in common law pleading in its classic day.
In the Circuit Court of Appeals and
in the Supreme Court the respondent
contended that the original complaint had

alleged a discrimination by discharging
five men; that after all the evidence was
in, this complaint was withdrawn and a
new one presented alleging that the respondent had refused to reemploy the
five men; that the Board in its findings
had reverted to the original position that
the respondent had not failed to employ
but had discharged the employees; and
that thus the respondent was found
guilty of an unfair labor practice which
was not within the issues upon which the
case was tried. The Supreme Court rejected the respondent's contention and
laid down the applicable general principle
in the following terms:
"A review of the record shows that at
no time during the hearings was there
any misunderstanding as to what was
the basis of the Board's complaint. The
entire evidence, pro and con, was directed to the question whether, when the
strike failed and the men desired to come
back and were told that the strike would
be forgotten and that they might come
back in a body save for eleven men who
were singled out for different treatment,
six of whom, however, were treated like
everyone else, the respondent did in fact
discriminate against the remaining five
because of union activity. While the respondent was entitled to know the basis
of the complaint against it, and to explain its conduct, in an effort to meet
that complaint, we find from the record
that it understood the issue and was afforded full opportunity to justify the action of its officers as innocent rather than
discriminatory."
A somewhat similar question arose in
Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.
Ed. -,

decided by the Supreme Court,

December 5, 1938. In that case the
Board had ordered the respondent not to
give effect to certain contracts which the
Board found had been entered into as
part of the respondent's unfair labor
practices. The respondent and the labor
organization adversely affected contended that the validity of the contracts was
not in issue in the Board's proceeding
and that the Board's order on this point
was therefore void. Although the mem-
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bers of the court disagreed upon the application of the rule there was no disagreement that the governing principle in
the case was whether or not the issue of
the validity of the contracts had been
"actually litigated."
In general it may be said that the foregoing problems of pleading with which
the Board has been concerned are not
materially different from those which
confront most other administrative agencies having functions similar to those exercised by the National Labor Relations
Board. And, on the whole, it can be said
that general principles, such as those
enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
Mackay and Consolidated Edison decisions, are equally applicable to the proceedings of such other administrative
agencies and can give full protection, on
matters of pleading, to the rights of parties appearing before them.
A second series of questions with
which the Board has been concerned relates to matters of evidence. As I have
stated, the National Labor Relations Act
provides that in proceedings before the
Board "the rules of evidence prevailing
in the courts of law or equity shall not
be controlling." This provision is similar to that appearing in other laws creating administrative agencies to handle the
initial enforcement of legislation. From
the point of view of swift and efficient
enforcement, in a proceeding where the
issues are presented not to a jury but to
a trained body of experts, there can be
no doubt of the wisdom of dispensing
with the requirement that the strict rules
of evidence be followed. Nevertheless,
such freedom in the acceptance of testimony, especially when coupled with the
provision that the Board's findings of
fact if supported by evidence are'conclusive, may well give rise to serious problems of fair hearing.
To what extent can the Board ignore
the hearsay rule? Should the Board adhere to the best evidence rule? Is it
proper for the Board's trial examiners to
permit leading questions on direct examination? May counsel impeach his own
witnesses? To what extent and under
what circumstances are employers enti-

tled to subpcena the records of a labor
organization? To what extent may the
trial examiner cut short examination or
participate in examination himself?
These are some of the questions which
frequently arise. It is impossible to consider all of them in detail at this time,
but it may be worth while to discuss
briefly what is probably the most important of them,-the hearsay rule:
It will readily be acknowledged that
most hearsay testimony has little or no
probative value. Nevertheless the Board
has not found it wise to exclude hearsay
evidence altogether. For one thing, many
of the witnesses before the Board have
not had the benefit of formal education
and are quite unaware of the significance
of various facts which may be relevant
to the proceeding. Consequently it is
often advisable for the trial examiner to
allow considerable leeway with respect to
hearsay upon the theory that it may introduce or point the way to important
leads hitherto undeveloped. Again, testimony which, though hearsay, is within
the power of the respondent to deny or
explain, but which is left uncontradicted
on the record, may under certain circumstances be reasonably relied upon as having probative value.
I think of a situation of that kind.
John Smith has been discharged, as he
claims, for union activities. He says
that the company told him, when it discharged him, that there was no more
work for him to do. He says that fellow
workers told him later, when he had no
access to the plant to find out for himself, that immediately upon his discharge
another man was put into his place and
the work went on.
Now, there you have a situation where
it is perfectly easy for the company to
show what the truth of the matter is.
So, if that hearsay is admitted and then
the company makes no response to it at
all, probably reasonable people would
have a right to assume that the truth was
in accordance with the hearsay.
In general, as I have said, the Board
adheres to the hearsay rule unless good
reason appears for making an exception
thereto. And in no case that I recall has
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the Board relied solely upon hearsay to
support an essential finding of fact.
What I have said is, I think, sufficient
to show the advisability of leaving the
Board free to admit hearsay evidence,
and to rely upon it where reasonable to
do so. The question before us is whether there can be laid down any general
rule, applicable by way of judicial review, which would check the Board in
the event of extravagant use of hearsay
evidence. Necessarily such a rule would
have to be stated in broad terms, and its
application would have to vary with the
circumstances. Yet the guiding principles which, again if intelligently and sympathetically applied, should afford adequate protection against real abuse can
probably be stated. In National Labor
Relations Board v. Remington Rand,
Inc., 94 F.2d 862, the circuit court of
appeals for the second circuit (Learned
Hand, J.) has already attempted the
statement of such a principle:
"(The Trial Examiner) did indeed admit much that would have been excluded at common law, but the act specifically
so provides, Section 10(b), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 160(b) ; no doubt, that does not mean
that mere rumor will serve to 'support'
a finding, but hearsay may do so, at
least if more is not conveniently available, and if in the end the. finding is supported by the kind of evidence on which
responsible persons are accustomed to
rely in serious affairs." (Italics supplied.)
In the Consolidated Edison case the
Supreme Court stated a similar principle, coupling it with the rule that the
Board's findings of fact must be supported not merely "by evidence" but by
"substantial" evidence:
"The companies contend that the Court
of Appeals misconceived its power to
review the findings and, instead of
searching the record to see if they were
sustained by 'substantial' evidence, merely considered whether the record was
'wholly barren of evidence' to support
them. We agree that the statute, in
providing that 'the findings of the Board
as to the facts, if supported by evidence,
shall be conclusive,' Section 10(e), 29

U.S.C.A. § 160(e), means supported by
substantial evidence. Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142,
147, 57 S.Ct. 648, 650, 81 L.Ed. 965.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F.
2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations
Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97
F.2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2
Cir., 98 F.2d 758, 760. We do not think
that the Court of Appeals intended to
apply a different test. In saying that the
record was not 'wholly barren of evidence' to sustain the finding of discrimination, we think that the court referred
to substantial evidence. Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor
Relations board, supra.
"The companies urge that the Board
received 'remote hearsay' and 'mere rumor.' The statute provides that 'the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law and equity shall not be controlling.'
The obvious purpose of this and similar
provisions is to free administrative
boards from the compulsion of technical
rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent
in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird,
194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S.Ct. 563, 568, 48
L.Ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
227 U.S. 88, 93, 33 S.Ct. 185, 187, 57
L.Ed. 431; United States v. Abilene &
Southern Ry. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 288, 44
S.Ct. 565, 569, 68 L.Ed. 1016; Tagg
Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280
U.S. 420, 442, 50 S.Ct. 220, 225, 74 L.
Ed. 524. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify
orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence."
(Italics
supplied.)
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In certain important respects the problems of evidence with which the National Labor Relations Board deals are peculiar to the field of labor relations and
the application of the foregoing principles must be made with these peculiarities in mind. Thus, as I have said, the
absence of formal education on the part
of most witnesses appearing in Board
proceedings has an important bearing
upon the application of the hearsay rule
and upon the advisability of permitting
leading questions. So, too, to mention
but one more example, the need of a
labor organization to keep its membership and activity concealed from a hostile employer is of extreme significance
in determining the extent to which an
employer may be permitted to inspect
union books and records. I think it
may safely be said, however, that the
foregoing rule, which necessarily must be
stated in general language, can serve
equally well as the guiding principle for
other administrative agencies making determinations of fact. Variances between
agencies, such as have been pointed out
above, can be normally taken care of in
the application of the rule to the circumstances of the particular case.
A third problem of importance has
been the question whether a fair hearing
requires the issuance of an Intermediate
Report by the trial examiner or, in lieu
thereof, the issuance of proposed findings of fact by the Board, with the opportunity to file exceptions thereto and
argue orally before the Board. After
the decision of the Supreme Court in the
second Morgan case (Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. 1, 23, 58 S.Ct. 773, 999,
82 L.Ed. 1129) it was contended that
the Board's procedure was fatally defective in a few cases where it had dispensed with the trial examiner's report
and had not issued proposed findings of
fact. This contention was answered by
the Supreme Court in the Mackay case
and again in the Consolidated Edison
case. In the Mackay case the court
said:
"At the conclusion of the testimony,
and prior to oral argument before the
examiner, the Board transferred the pro-

ceeding to Washington to be further
heard before the Board. It denied respondent's motion to resubmit the cause
to the trial examiner with directions to
prepare and file an intermediate report.
In the Circuit Court of Appeals the
respondent assigned error to this ruling.
It appears that oral argument was had
and a brief was filed with the Board
after which it made its findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The respondent
now asserts that the failure of the Board
to follow its usual practice of the submission of a tentative report by the trial
examiner and a hearing on exceptions to
that report deprived the respondent of
opportunity to call to the Board's attention the alleged fatal variance between
the allegations of the complaint and the
Board's findings. What we have said
sufficiently indicates that the issues and
contentions of the parties were clearly
defined and as no other detriment or disadvantage is claimed to have ensued from
the Board's procedure the matter is not
one calling for a reversal of the order.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees no
particular form of procedure; it protects substantial rights. Compare Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 478,
56 S.Ct. 906, 910, 80 L.Ed. 1288. The
contention that the respondent was denied a full and adequate hearing must
be rejected."
In the Consolidated Edison case, in response to a similar contention that the
lack of an Intermediate Report or proposed findings constituted, a denial of a
fair hearing, the Supreme Court stated:
"It cannot be said that the Board did
not consider the evidence or the petitioners' brief or failed to make its own findings in the light of that evidence and argument. It would have been better practice for the Board to have directed the
examiner to make a tentative report
with an opportunity for exceptions and
argument thereon. But, aside from the
question of the Brotherhood contracts,
we find no basis for concluding that the
issues and contentions were not clearly
defined and that the petitioning companies were not fully advised of them.
National Labor Relations Board v.
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Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.
S. 333, 350, 351, 58 S.Ct. 904, 912, 82
L.Ed. 1381. The points raised as to the
lack of procedural due process in this
relation cannot be sustained."
On this question of the Intermediate
Report and proposed findings the considerations applicable to the Board's
procedure would seem to apply generally
to any administrative agency having
comparable procedure. In other words,
in any administrative proceeding where a
specific complaint is issued which defines the issues and apprises the respondent of them, it would seem clear that a
fair hearing does not require an Intermediate Report or proposed findings. It
is to be noted, however, that the Chief
Justice in the Consolidated Edison case
expressed the opinion that the issuance
of an Intermediate Report by the trial
examiner, or presumably the issuance of
proposed findings in lieu thereof, would
be "better practice," and, in fact, the
Board has, since the decision in the second Morgan case, adopted the policy in
unfair labor practice cases of issuing
proposed findings whenever the trial examiner, for whatever reason, does not
prepare an Intermediate Report.
It does not follow from the foregoing,
however, that an Intermediate Report is
"better practice" in every type of administrative proceeding. Thus somewhat
different considerations apply in proceedings before the Board for determination of representatives. There the
factor of speed is more important than in
the normal unfair labor practice case. It
is vital, from the viewpoint both of averting industrial strife and of assuring to
employees the full rights guaranteed by
the Act, that the determination of representatives proceed with dispatch. Furthermore, as stated abo~Ve, the Board's
representation proceedings result merely in a certification of fact and not in an
order binding upon the employer or upon anyone else. Consequently the Board,
in the interest of promptness, dispenses
with the Intermediate Report in a representation case, both after the initial
hearing and after the hearing upon ob-

jections to the ballot, if one is held. If
the Board could be concerned only with
giving the parties all possible procedural
protection an Intermediate Report could
be provided fur in such situations. But
to do so would afford the parties only a
slight additional procedural benefit while
at the same time materially impairing
important substantive rights guaranteed
under the Act. Under such circumstances it would not seem that the general principles of a fair hearing would
recommend the procedure of an Intermediate Report or proposed findings.
Finally, there is another problem of
fair hearing which has been raised in
connection with the Board's procedure
but which has thus far not been finally
disposed of by the courts. Some of the
respondents in cases decided by the
Board, relying principally upon the second Morgan decision, have contended
that they have the right, as a matter of
determining the fair hearing issue, to
inquire into the Board's internal operations with a view to discovering whether
the Board itself has considered the evidence and made its own findings, or
whether those functions were improperly
delegated to subordinates. This question has normally been raised by pleadings before the Circuit Court of Appeals
alleging on information and belief that
the Board members themselves did not
consider or appraise the evidence or did
not make the findings of fat which were
issued as the Board's decision. Such
pleading has usually been supplemented
by a motion to require the Board members and others to answer interrogatories, or a motion to take depositions of
the Board members and others, or both.
The considerations which should be
determinative of this issue in so far as
the National Labor Relations Board is
concerned, seem to me equally applicable to all administrative agencies which
have the function of adjudication, and in
fact to the courts themselves. And it
can scarcely be doubted that the issue is
a vital one in judicial procedure. A
somewhat similar inquiry into the functioning of the Secretary of Agriculture in
the Morgan case occupied several days
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of trial. In the case of a court or board stressed. With the expansion of adwhich makes hundreds of adjudications ministrative procedure into numerous
during a year, if a litigant in each case fields of government operations, I concould, upon allegations based on infor- ceive it to be of vital importance to demation and belief, subject the court or velop general principles, such as rules
board to an inquisition as to its methods, implementing the requirement of fair
its work would be seriously impaired. hearing, which will serve to prevent
Without going into the issues further it abuse of the administrative process. On
seems clear to me that if the procedure the whole I believe that satisfactory prinof an administrative agency makes pro- ciples broadly applicable to the procedure
vision for a complaint which defines the of the various administrative agencies
issues, for an Intermediate Report or can be worked out.
However, these
proposed findings which redefine the is- principles will of necessity be general in
sues after hearing, and for an oral argu- nature, and their application to specific
ment, or opportunity for oral argument circumstances must depend upon the
before the agency itself, the requirements- factors governing the particular situaof fair hearing do not permit an inquiry tion. In the end they will serve their
into the internal operations of the ad- purpose only if they are applied with a
ministrative agency, at least in the ab- sympathetic grasp of the functions of
sence of specific allegations of fraud.
the administrative process and an inIn conclusion, I may perhaps be per- telligent understanding of the problems
mitted to repeat what I have already to be solved.

CHESTER T. LANE
General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission

Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Association of American Law Schools:
I must tell you at the outset that'I do
not propose to, indeed I cannot, answer
this question entirely responsively. For
me to try to set the limit beyond which
fairness cannot go, to try to define the
wide variety of administrative tribunals
and administrative proceedings to which
any given set of rules of fairness must
be applicable, would be to assume a
breadth of experience and a certainty of
knowledge to which I have no claim. To
me, administration, and administrative
law, are very broad terms, used to cover one general present-day aspect of the
continuing socio-legal system which we
have inherited and under which we are
now living. I can not follow the popular use of these words to convey condemnation of a supposedly new type of
bureaucracy, a New Deal oddity invented in political desperation to gloss over
governmental ineptitude by concentrating public attention on the evils of big
business. Administrative action is not,

as many critics would have it, a servant
girl recently hired from the neighboring
employment agency, of uncertain antecedents and doubtful utility in the household, to be praised or criticized, educated or restrained to the end that she may
be made worth her wages, and finally to
be discharged without a character if she
does not live up to her references.
It is too little understood that administrative law, even though the development of its techniques may be but another phase of the servant problem, is
no newcomer in our midst. Administrative law is an honorable and legitimate product of the permanent relationship between organized society and the
individual, with an ancestry in the direct
line going back many decades. We are
all familiar with the process by which
over centuries the demands of an expanding society induced the conscience
of the chancellor to implement the rigid
forms of the common law by the more
flexible and humanistic procedures and
doctrines of equity. By a process of de-
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velopment in many ways parallel, our
modern administrative law is a product
of the conflict between the conventions
of judicial procedure and the needs of an
ever-increasingly complex industrial society. I have no thought of tracing the
history of this conflict-that is for the
legal historians; but I do assert that a
realistic view of the problems of admininstrative law today requires an understanding that those problems are not
antochthonous nor even of recent birth.
The conflict from which they arose has
been going on for nearly a century, and
almost every issue now discussed was
raised long before 1933.
This point may be well illustrated by
examining the course of affairs which
led, in the heat and frayed emotions of
the summer of 1914, to the creation of
the Federal Trade Commission. On
January 24, 1914, just after President
Wilson had proposed his legislative program, there appeared in the columns of
the New York Times this dispatch (page
11, column 1) :
"C. Stuart Patterson, banker and director of the Pennsylvania Railroad,
and ex-attorney general William Hensel
united tonight in condemning
the Wilson anti-trust legislation in addresses before the Terrapin Club.
"'A revolution is going on,' said Mr.
Patterson, 'and it will go still further.
• . . This vexatious interference
with business is dangerous to the whole
people. It affrights capital and halts investment; and in turn, it hurts labor.
When this interfering legislation is enacted, the man of wealth is able to look
after himself, but the man who depends
upon his weekly wage is the one who
suffers. So this becomes class legislation.
" 'You cannot in justice create adversity for one class and prosperity for
another. Every class must be treated
alike.
.
. .Sober
sense will call a
halt on the interference of little Politics
with Big Business, and there will be a
demand for legislation that will put all
men on a common equality.
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"'If it is proper to legislate good
wages for the shop girl, it is also iniquitous to impose a starvation income upon
railroads. And if it is wrong for business interests to form combinations to
regulate prices and protect their business,
then it is equally unlawful for labor to
combine to dictate to capital'."
Not unexpectedly the National Association of Clothiers, the Chamber of Commerce, the Merchants' Association of
New York, and the editorial columns of
the various newspapers joined the chorus
of protest.
Criticism of the President's legislative
program was finally centered against the
proposal to entrust the Federal Trade
Commission with functions of investigation and decision. The Commission, it
was said, might be satisfactory if it did
no more than make recommendations to
Congress, if, like the old and useless
Bureau of Corporations, its functions
were limited to "appeals to reason and
publicity." One bitter opponent of the
Federal Trade Commission declared that
the proposed administrative body's "efficiency is that of a monarchy . . .
and has no place whatever in a democracy". New York Times, 8-17-14; page
12. And Representative Montague stated at the hearings before the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
(page 80): "Your bill proceeds on the
theory . . . that the division of this
government into three branches
should be practically abolished
and the rights of the individual should
not be considered.
.
.
.
Does not
your bill . . . go back 400 or 500
years to the old days of tyranny?"
The parallel is obvious. The newspapers
told of the bitter fight between government and "big business." Business demanded a cessation of governmental interference that it might have a "breathing spell."
President Wilson accused
business of creating a "psychological depression" to defeat his legislative aims.
But the Federal Trade Commission was
created and there is little suggestion today that it be abolished.
In thus recalling historical parallels
I am far from suggesting futility in the
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discussion of problems of administrative
law. For even though no problem be a
new one, there can be no doubt that the
expansion of administrative functions in
recent years has given new importance to
the role of the administrator which demands the most careful reexamination
even of old problems which appear to
have been solved. We have passed many
years from the days when the Interstate
Commerce Commission, narrow as its
powers were, stood out in solitary prominence as a Federal administrative agency. As Professor Gardner points out in
his piquant review of Dean Landis' book
on "The Administrative Process," we
now have: "the Interstate Commerce
Commission, which more and more governs transportation and travel, the Federal Reserve Board, which more and
more governs banking, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which tries to
govern all our investments, the Federal
Trade Commission, which tries to govern the marketing of our manufactures,
the National Labor Relations Board,
which interferes in the making of these
manufactures, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which taxes all of us
to lend to whom it thinks fitting, and the
Tennessee Valley Authority, which taxes
all of us to make over that valley according td the hopes of a few gentlemen's
hearts."
52 Harv.L.Rev. 336, 338
(1938).
This expansion of the administrative
process has undoubtedly caused severe
anguish of soul to many sincere men
besides Professor Gardner; but undoubtedly it has also been bitterly fought
by many whose articulate distress marked only self-interest and callous unconcern with public needs.
In spite of the intense conflict which
has regularly attended the growth of the
administrative process, I suppose there
are few informed persons who will not
in all honesty admit that the administrative commission is not merely a useful
handmaiden, but an indispensable agent
of modern democratic government.
Even Professor Gardner concludes, although indefinitely, that "they are very
good things to work for us-provided we

can afford the expense of them-but
that they are very bad things to rule
our lives." Nevertheless, at least those
of us whose business is administrative
law are fully aware that neither design
nor function in administration has been
finally perfected; and criticism even
from prejudiced sources may be helpful, particularly criticism of, administrative methods and procedures. For uncertainties and differences in procedural
methods, and in the administrative policies which shape those methods, are irritating and may even be oppressive. Indeed, their effect may be to weaken respect for the whole administrative process.
With the thought of inviting your
comment and criticism, I propose, not to
respond definitely to the question before
me, but to try to give you a picture of
the salient outlines of procedure in the
one agency of the government with
whose work I am closely familiar, the
Securities and Exchange Commission. I
recognize that conditions in one agency
may differ widely from those in another,
and that the techniques we have adopted
in our effort to assure administrative fair
play might be entirely inadequate to the
problem of administrative bodies charged
with the enforcement of other types of
statutes. However, the Securities and
Exchange Commission itself is by now
far from being a simple organism; with
the steady increase of its statutory jurisdiction it has undertaken the conduct
of almost every type of proceeding
known to administrative law. Our Commission, it seems to me, affords an admirable opportunity for clinical study of
the question which has been posed.
As you are very likely aware, the Securities and Exchange Commission administers three statutes: the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a et seq.,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78 a et seq., and the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
15 U.S.C.A. § 79 et seq. Our advisory
functions under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act may for present purposes be
disregarded. Each of these statutes is
regulatory in character, and the subject
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matter of each is business-the distribution of securities, mechanics and practices of securities markets, and the management of gas and electric utility holding companies. Each of these statutes
confers power upon the Commission to
promulgate rules and regulations of general applicability and legal effect, prescribing in every instance appropriate
standards for the guidance of the Commission. This rule making power in itself raises questions for discussion,
among the more interesting of which is
whether hearings, on notice to interested
groups of the community, are necessary
or appropriate to the exercise of this essentially legislative function. I propose,
however, to limit my inquiry to the order making power. For under each of
the statutes the Commission may, after
notice and hearing, issue final orders,
which adjudicate the rights and liabilities
of individuals and companies with the
force and effect of law, and which are
reviewable by the appellate courts in
much the same manner as final judgments of courts of first instance. It is
the fairness of hearings in proceedings
culminating in such quasi-judicial orders that I assume forms the principal
subject matter of this discussion.
As I said, the work of the Securities
and Exchange Commission involves a
wide variety of types of proceedings culminating in final quasi-judicial orders.
From a procedural point of view, however, there has been developed within
the Commission a rather clear line of demarcation between two broad classes of
proceedings: one, actions of a prosecutory nature instituted by the Commission
itself with a view to the suspension of
some privilege, either pending compliance with law or as a penalty for its infraction, and the other, actions begun by
formal application of private parties to
secure from the Commission the grant of
some privilege or relief from some statutory prohibition. These classifications
are not water-tight, but I propose to accept them for purposes of discussion.
For purposes of convenient distinction
.I will call the former adversary proceed-
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ings, and the latter administrative proceedings.
Typical of adversary proceedings are
stop order proceedings under the Securities Act to suspend the effectiveness of
a registration statement, and proceedings
under the Securities Exchange Act to
suspend the registration of a security
listed on a national securities exchange.
Typical of administrative proceedings
are applications under the Securities Exchange Act for the extension of unlisted
trading privileges on national securities
exchanges, and applications under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act for
exemption from the restrictions imposed
by the statute upon the applicant as a
holding company or as a subsidiary company, or for authority to issue or acquire
securities or utility assets. It may be
fielpful to consider in detail one example
of each class: the stop order proceeding
under the Securities Act, and the application for authority to issue securitiesthe declaration-under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act.
Briefly stated, the purpose of the Securities Act is to protect the investor
against fraudulent or unethical practices
in the sale of securities. This protection
is in part achieved by means of injunctions and criminal sanctions against
fraud in the sale of securities, through
the mails or in interstate commerce.
These sanctions are enforced only by
the courts on application and proper
showing by the Commission or, in the
case of criminal proceedings, by the Attorney General. tut the Act also contains prophylactic provisions-provisions
designed to protect the investing public
from misrepresentation or concealment
by requiring full disclosure of all facts
bearing materially upon the value of securities sold through the mails or any
other instrumentalities of interstate commerce. To achieve this end, Section 5
(a) of the Act provides, with certain exceptions, that no security may be offered,
sold, or delivered after sale, through the
mails or in interstate commerce, unless
there is in effect as to such security a
"registration statement" describing the
security and the issuer in appropriate de-

The American Law School Review
tail. Under Section 8 (a) a registration
statement, in the absence of amendment
by the issuer or action by the Commission postponing the effective date, becomes effective automatically upon the
twentieth day after its filing with the
Commission.
Although the Commission has no authority under the Act to approve or disapprove of securities, or in any way to
pass upon their merits, the role of the
Commission in connection with registration statements is not a passive one. Unless the Commission were empowered to
examine into the truth and completeness
of a registration statement, and to require the correction of false or inadequate data, the purposes of the Act
would fall far short of achievement.
Section 8 (d) of the Act therefore donfers upon the Commission the duty of
suspending the effectiveness of any registration statement which, after notice
and hearing, is found to contain material misstatements or omissions. Specifically, that section provides as follows:
If it appears to the Commission at
any time that the registration statement
includes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, the Commission may, after
notice by personal service or the sending
of confirmed telegraphic notice, and after
opportunity for hearing (at a time fixed
by the Commission) within fifteen days
after such notice by personal service or
the sending of such telegraphic notice, issue a stop order suspending the effectiveness of the registration statement.
When such statement has been amended
in accordance with such stop order the
Commission shall so declare and thereupon the stop order shall cease to be
effective.
It will be seen that to some extent
the statute itself prescribes procedural
details to be followed in the institution
and conduct of stop order proceedings.
The statutory requirements, however,
are of the broadest, and have necessarily,
and I believe appropriately, been imple-

mented by general Rules of Practice, applicable to all proceedings alike. TheseRules of Practice embody, at least in
part, the Commission's own self-imposed
standards of judicial self-limitation.
The proceeding for a stop order is begun after examination of the registration
statement by an examining group in the
Registration Division of the Commission.
If the Registration Division concludes
that the statement is materially false or
misleading, authorization for a hearing
under Section 8 (d) is sought from the
Commission. Thereupon, if the Commission agrees that the registration statement does not appear to comply with thestatutory standards of disclosure, confirmed telegraphic notice of opportunity
for hearing within fifteen days is sent to.
the registrant together with a "Statement
of Matters to be Considered" in the nature of a detailed bill of particulars..
The Rules of Practice specifically provide that:
"Such notice shall state the time and
place of hearing and shall include a statement of the items in the registration
statement by number or name which appear to be incomplete or inaccurate in.
any material respect, or to include any
untrue statement of a material fact, or to
omit a statement of any material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statement therein not
misleading. Such notice shall be given
either by personal service or by confirmed telegraphic notice a reasonable
time in advance of the hearing. The personal notice or the confirmation of telegraphic notice shall be accompanied by
a short and simple statement of the matters and items specified to be considered
and determined." Rule III(b).
In the proceeding the Commission is
represented by an attorney from the staff
of the Registration Division, which in
judicial analogy may be regarded as the
plaintiff. The hearing is public in character and held before a trial examiner*
designated by the Commission; all testimony is stenographically reported and
made part of the record; copies of the
transcript are made available to all parties to the proceeding. Trial examiners
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as a matter of internal organization are
not subordinated to any official other
than the Commission itself, and the Registration Division has no voice in the
selection of a trial examiner for any
particular case. At the conclusion of
the hearing each party (which term, as I
am using it, includes the Registration
Division) may then file with the trial
examiner "statement in writing in terse
outline setting forth such party's request
for specific findings, which may be accompanied by a brief in support thereof". Rule IX (e), Rules of Practice.
Both the requested findings and the supporting briefs are also served upon all
parties. Ten days after the receipt of
the transcript of testimony the trial ex.aminer is required by the Commission's
Rules of Practice to file with the Secretary of the Commission an advisory report containing his findings of fact,
copies of which are immediately transmitted to each party. Within five days
.after receipt of the report exceptions
may be taken to the findings proposed by
the trial examiner, to his failure to make
findings, or to the omission or exclusion
of evidence. Briefs may be filed in support of such exceptions, and, upon written request of any party, oral argument may be had before the Commission.
Thereafter the entire rec.ord, including a transcript of the oral
argument before the Commission, if such
.argument was requested, is transmitted
to the Commission's General Counsel,
whose office is as a matter of internal organization entirely separate and distinct
from the Registration Division, for consideration and the preparation of an appropriate opinion containing the necessary findings in support of a stop order,
or dismissing the proceeding. The actual drafting is done by attorneys in the
Opinion Section of the General Counsel's Office, under the guidance of an Assistant General Counsel and a Supervising Attorney. The draftsmen are
under strict instructions not to confer
with the trial examiner or with trial
counsel in the Registration Division. In
the initial stages the draftsmen, as like
.as not, have only the most general inti-

mation of the Commission's tentative
viewpoint or approach to the case. The
first draft of the opinion is thus prepared on the basis of the record itself,
without conference with any party to the
proceeding, and without pressure or suggestion from any source outside of the
Commission and the General Counsel's
Office. Copies of the draft opinion are
circulated among the members of the
Commission for individual consideration,
and later the opinion is called for joint
discussion among the draftsmen and the
Commissioners in Commission meeting.
By that time each Commissioner is familiar with the record, has read the proposed opinion, has reached some decision
in his own mind, and is prepared to discuss the issues and offer suggestions as
to the form and content of the opinion.
I admit frankly that in most cases the
opinion is not acceptable in its first draft
and must be rewritten in accordance with
the matured conclusions of the Commission. Occasionally a completely new
opinion, or even alterative opinions, must
be prepared. If a Commissioner dissents
from the determination of the majority,
he will himself ordinarily write a dissenting opinion containing the reasons
for his dissent.
I take it that this procedure is "fair,"
"proper," and "judicial" under any decision heretofore rendered by the Supreme
Court, and indeed goes far beyond the
current judicial requirements of due
process. The position of the trial examiner, however, deserves further consideration. In many agencies, at least, adjudication is now largely centered in the
trial examiner. The rules of procedure
are formulated chiefly for the hearings
before him. In a real sense he is becoming a lower administrative tribunal, and
the regulatory authority is itself in fact,
if not in theory, becoming a tribunal of
second instance. Should this be clearly
recognized and written into the law? I
suggest the possibility that there may be
enough likeness between the judicial
functions of the trial examiners in the
various regulatory agencies, to justify
placing them by law or Executive Order
on a unified basis. Many questions must
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be answered, however, before progress
can be made. The following questions
have been asked, not with reference to
the Securities, and Exchange Commission specifically, but with reference to
trial examiners generally. "Should trial
examiners be under the Civil Service?
Should they have specialized training in
the field of economics with which they
are respectively concerned, as well as in
the field of law? Should they make real
decisions, such as are made by the individual members of the Board of Tax
Appeals? Should their decisions be given to the contesting parties, who shall
have a right to take exceptions to them?
If exceptions are taken should the case
then be heard by the Board or Commission? In case no exceptions are taken
should the case be considered as closed
by the Commission? Should the trial
examiners continue to be the mere agents
of the Board or Commission, or should
they be given a more independent status?
Should the principle be further developed
that all cases of a regulatory nature be
heard de novo before trial examiners, or
should certain cases be reserved to the
Commission itself? Should the Commission have the right to call up any case
pending before trial examiners for its
own consideration ?" See Blachly, Working Papers on Administrative Adjudication, page 3.
Other questions arise regarding the
scope of his activities. At the present
time the report of the trial examiner for
the Securities and Exchange Commission
includes only findings of fact together
with a recommendation for action. There
is no statement of the principles of law
involved. The Rules of Practice provide, moreover, that the "report shall be
advisory only, and the findings of fact
therein contained shall not be binding upSo far as our
on the Commission."
Commission is concerned, this provision
is taken seriously; the record in each
case is reexamined meticulously by the
impartial Opinion Section of the General
Counsel's Office, and reconsidered by the
Commissioners, and only such weight is
given to the trial examiner's report as in
the particular case it-appears to deserve.

This practice, however, adequate as it
may be to assure fair and impartial treatment to the respondent, suggests a real
necessity for reexamination of the functions of the trial examiner. If the Commission is free wholly to disregard the
trial examiner's report, it may be questioned whether the report adequately
serves one of its most important supposed functions, that of notifying the
parties of the issues involved. The issues discussed in such a report may not
be the issues which move the Commission. Exceptions and argument directed
to a report which has no binding quality
may be futile. One alternative, therefore, might be to eliminate the trial examiner's report altogether, or at least to
utilize it merely as a confidential document for the Commission's assistance in
analyzing the record.
However, although the Mackay Radio
& Telegraph Co. case (304 U.S. 333, 58
S.Ct. 904, 82 L.Ed. 1381) shows that the
trial examiner's report is not a sine qua
non of administrative fairness, its value
in this regard is clearly suggested by the
opinion of the Supreme Court in the second Morgan case (304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct.
773, 999, 82 L.Ed. 1129), and it may well
be doubted whether further limitation of
the trial examiner's functions would fully exploit the advantages in the trial examiner device. Serious consideration
might therefore be given to the possibility, as an alternative solution, of giving
to trial examiners greater authority in
the making of their reports and findings,
with power to write their decisions into
intermediate orders which, unless excepted to by one side or the other, would become the final orders of the Commission.
I do not urge such a solution, but it is
at least one that cannot be disregarded.
I am aware that existing statutory provisions may not permit such a delegation
of authority by administrative agencies,
but as one commentator has recently
pointed out, "Legislative draftsmen continue to copy slavishly the procedural
provisions of old statutes, since they have
no means of determining how those provisions can be improved." Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal
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Administrative Law, 47 Yale L.J. 647
(1938). It is conceivable that our experience may crystallize into concrete suggestions for statutory improvement, at
least for future statutes. I also recognize that merely conferring the powers
of a judge upon men who have no competence for judging, by no means solves
the problem. There is much weight in
the current criticism that trial examiners
are too frequently yes-men for the commissions they serve, and in Dean Landis's statement that "Today trial examiners' staffs on the whole have too little
competence." Landis, The Administrative Process, page 104. However, we
must at least recognize that if we are to
retain the trial examiner, improvement
cannot be secured by lessened responsibility and continued impairment of function, but only by greater responsibility
and higher standards of personnel.
Now let me describe somewhat more
briefly an example of what I have referred to as administrative proceedings.
Section 6 (a) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act provides that it shall
be unlawful to issue or sell any security
except in accordance with a declaration
effective under Section 7 and with an order under Section 7 permitting such declaration to become effective. Section 7
describes the information which must be
included in the declaration and lays down
standards to guide the Commission in determining whether or not the declaration
shall be permitted to become effective.
A declaration upon filing is submitted at
once to an examining group in the Public Utilities Division. Amendments may
then be called for to clarify or amplify
the information originally submitted;
conferences are often held between the
management and the Commission's staff,
and finally the matter is set down for
hearing. Since the proceeding is instituted by the declarant, he is of course
fully aware of the questions to be considered; the notice of hearing, therefore,
merely states the time of the hearing, the
place, and the subject matter. Rule XII
(a). The hearing, like a hearing in a
stop order proceeding, is held before a
trial examiner designated by the Coin-

mission, and the Commission is represented by attorneys from the staff of the
Public Utilities Division. The trial examiner does not prepare any report, but
within five days after the transcript of
testimony is filed with the Secretary of
the Commission,. any party may submit
requests for specific findings, together
with supporting briefs, copies of which
are immediately served upon all parties to
the proceeding. Fifteen days after requests are filed for specific findings, plenary briefs may be filed in support of all
contentions and exceptions. Upon written request, moreover, oral argument
may be had before the Commission. The
case is then submitted to the Commission
"on the moving papers, the transcript of
the testimony and exhibits received at the
hearing, requests for specific findings, if
any, the briefs of the parties and counsel
to the Commission, if any, and oral argument before the Commission, if any."
Rule XII (b).
Frequently the applicant chooses to
submit his case on the declaration without hearing and without further evidence. In such case an attorney for the
Public Utilities Division appears before
the trial examiner on the date set for
hearing, offers the formal papers and the
declaration in evidence, and closes the
record without trial. Ordinarily these
are cases in which the staff of the Public
Utilities Division are satisfied that the
proposed issue complies with statutory
standards, and are prepared to recommend that the declaration be declared effective. The draft opinion, under these
circumstances, is prepared by the trial
attorney, and thereafter submitted to the
Commission for consideration and correction. If the case is contested, however, or if adverse action, or qualified
approval, is proposed by the Public Utilities Division, the matter is transmitted
to the office of the General Counsel
where the findings and opinion are prepared by an independent attorney in the
Opinion Section and the case proceeds as
if it were a stop order proceeding or
some other adversary proceeding.
In my opinion the procedures followed
by the Commission in both adversary and
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administrative proceedings, as I have
called them, are more than adequate to
meet all sensible demands of due process
or of ordinary fair play. Regardless of
whether a trial examiner's report is used,
the issues in each case are clearly delineated by the statutory requirements, the
rules and regulations of the Commission, and the forms provided by the
Commission; the position of the Commission's staff on any particular matter
is plainly disclosed not merely by conference, hearing, and cross-examination, but
by the proposed findings of fact, briefs,
and oral argument; the Commission's
final decision is based upon its own independent consideration of the case, with
the assistance of a qualified and impartial
group of attorneys in every case of real
or threatened disagreement between the
Commission and the respondent or applicant. Moreover, the petition for rehearing is available to offset error or surprise in final adjudication. Rule XII
(d).
In thus outlining to you in specific detail the procedure followed by the Commission in two of its commonest types
of proceedings, I should be disingenuous
if I left you with the implication that
prelcisely the same devices of procedure
are followed in all proceedings before the
Commission. As I have said, our Commission deals with a wide variety of
quasi-judicial proceedings, each of which,
for its most efficient dispatch, may require a different 'technique.
Furthermore, administrative law in its very nature is itself flexible, designed primarily
for the purpose of affording relief from
the rigidity of judicial forms. And perhaps even more important from the point
of our Commission, the Commission itself is young-young in experience,
young in years, even young in the years
of its members and its staff. I am proud
to say that no practice of the Commission can yet be regarded as immutable,
that the Commission itself is constantly
reexamining and criticizing its own procedure, and readjusting it to bring it into
closer conformity with the high standards of efficiency, fair play and public

interest which the Commission has set
before it.
Thus far I have confined myself to the
administrative practice of the Commission itself, without regard to the protective features afforded by the possibility
of judicial review. Under each of our
statutes, any person aggrieved by an order of the Commission may obtain judicial review of such order in the Circuit
Court of Appeals by filing in the appropriate court, within sixty days after the
entry of the order, 'a written petition
praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside, in whole
or in part. The Commission is required,
upon service of such a petition, to file in
the court a transcript of the complete
record upon which the order complained
of was entered, and upon the filing of
such transcript the court is given exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, and
enforce or set aside, such order, in whole
or in part. Each Act also contains the
usual provision that the judgment and
decree of the court is subject to review
by the United States Supreme Court upon certiorari or certification.
Candor
compels me to admit, however, that the
remedy of judicial review, in most cases,
has no practical content. Business transactions cannot wait upon the exigencies
of appeal. The overwhelming mass of
administrative determinations are never
reviewed by the courts. Time is of the
essence. Even appellate procedure within the administrative by no means insures
that the unfortunate results of action unwise or arbitrary will be cured. The
remedy of appeal is not adequate.
The recognition of this fact has undoubtedly given impetus to the attack on
the so-called "Judge-Prosecutor" combination. No man, we are told, should be
a judge in his own case; one agency
should handle prosecution, another should
adjudicate. Lewis Carroll's cunning Old
Fury is quoted with abandon, and, viewing him with alarm, serious minded but,
I believe, misguided citizens enter on a
campaign for separation of functions.
Much has been said and written on
this subject-separation of functionswhich seems to me to disregard the reali-
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ties of administratikve practice and procedure. Certainly it is wise that an administrative agency should conduct its formeal proceedings according to the rules of
fair play which have been developed over
centuries by the conscience of the bench,
the bar, and the man in the street. Nnd
I cannot reasonably quarrel with the belief that rules and standards of conduct
in administrative hearings may appropriately be codified even in statute, if not
for the control of the administrator at
least for the reassurance of the public.
But let us not be deceived as to the importance of rules and standards in the
conduct of formal administrative hearings. Whether the Securities and Exchange Commission on final consideration will actually decide to enter a stop
order is interesting, but not very important; for only a rare investor would purchase securities from an issuer threatened with the administrative bar. When
the Securities and Exchange Commission actually delists a security, the news
is important; but the market drops when
the order for hearing is announced.
When a court actually issues an injunction against a continued violation of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act, the
news will be found in the back pages of
the financial columns; the filing of a bill
for injunction, however, is front page
news. If nine out of ten Commission orders never reach the courts for review,
ninety-nine out of a hundred business
problems presented to the Commission
for solution never reach the stage of formal proceedings even before the Commission. If the Commission were stripped of every vestige of judicial power,
the problem of administrative fair play
would remain substantially undiminished.
Furthermore, separation of functions
would necessarily mean impairment of
functions.
Rule-making and enforcement cannot be separated from interpretation and adjudication without sacrifice
of efficiency and of the public interest
sought to be protected or advanced. Coordination is imperative. I venture to
assert dogmatically that the regulatory
function of any board or commission
would suffer irretrievably if enforcement

and policy-making were completely divorced. If a rule is simple in its form,
and easily understandaile in its application, its enforcement may be left to the
courts by prohibition and punishment.
But business and industry are no longer
simple, and the rules required for their
control are exceedingly complicated; they
are no longer rules, indeed, but codes of
regulation, as ramified as the business
they regulate. Administration, therefore,
no longer entails mere prohibition, but
the sympathetic understanding of complicated business facts, uniformity of approach, and a constant time-consuming
supervisory interest. These are the minimum demands of business itself. And
successful administration in the narrow
fields of social and economic enterprise
entrusted to the administrative agencies
requires in addition sensitive awareness
of the legislative intent, a keen recognition of the sources of abuse and evasion
against which the legislation was aimed,
and a constant zeal for justice and the
public welfare. To require that the rules
and regulations under the Securities Exchange Act regarding the solicitation of
proxies should be drafted by one agency
and interpreted by another is to deprive
those who are subject to regulation of
the thought, the experience, and the understanding of those who know the most
about the rules-the draftsmen. If we
concede, as I think we must, that the implementation of statutes by rules requires
the aid of experts, it seems to me clear
beyond question that those same experts
are alone qualified to implement the policy expressed in the rules. Conflict,
waste, and inefficiency must attend any
separation of powers. While the current
attack on the blending of functions undoubtedly stems in part from those who
are sincerely concerned with the perfection of the administrative process as an
instrument of public welfare, care must
be taken to discount the fulminations of
those whose real motive springs from antagonism to all public regulation. To
them it is easy to answer that they come
too late; but we must not let them becloud the issue.
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And finally what I have said must
surely indicate that within the administrative there are already available numerous and adequate protective devices
against the possible abuses of combined
powers. So far at least as our Commission is concerned, trial examiners are
wholly independent of the trial attorneys
and are subject directly to the Commission. Trial attorneys have no contact
with the Commission in contested cases,
and in no way are permitted to shape the
final decision otherwise than by evidence
included in the record. The Opinion
Section in the General Counsel's office is
entirely separate from both the staff of
trial examiners and the trial attorneys.
Trial examiners, it is true, are paid from
the Commission's budget; but so are the
budgeting and general servicing of the
Federal judiciary handled by the Department of Justice. So far as I know, no
one has yet intimated that this control
has resulted in domination of the courts
by the executive. The trial examiner
and the trial attorney are both appointed
by the same group of men-the Commissioners; but does this make their independence and integrity more subject to
question than those of the District Attorney and judge elected to office simultaneously on the same political party
platform? On behalf of the trial examiners I resent the suggestion that they
are less honest than other judges.
In the second place, every order of the
Commission must be supported by appropriate findings of fact, and reasons

for every determination must be formulated in a Commission opinion. Arbitrary action, or even patently erroneous
action, is not likely to overcome the power of the balance wheel of enforced publicity.
Thirdly, it should not be forgotten that
no governmental agency can long exist
if its basic policy, as expressed in both
enforcement and adjudication, operates
in a manner contrary to the public interest. Businessmen are by no means
an inarticulate group; unfair or unreasonable practice is not likely to continue
long.
And lastly, it is of the greatest significance that most of the newer administrative agencies today are independent
tribunals, almost completely free from
interference by members of the executive and legislative departments.
The
tradition of independence, we may at
least hope, will develop rather than deteriorate with the passage of time. And
with the tradition of independence there
is developing in the government today
what Veblen has called the "instinct of
workmanship"-an attitude that, more
than rules or functional safeguards, affords assurance of informed and balanced judgments. The "ultimate protection," as Professor Frankfurter has
pointed out, "is to be found in ourselves,
our zeal for liberty, our respect for one
another and for the common good".
Frankfurter, The Public and its Government, page 159.

ELMER A. SMITH
GeneraZ Attorney for Illinois Central Railroad

President Arant, Ladies and Gentlemen: It is an old saying that happy
is the country that has no history. The
Interstate Commerce Commission has
been fortunate in that it has so conducted the hearings before it during its fiftyone years of life that the Supreme Court
in only two or three cases has had occasion to find that the Commission's

procedure resulted in a denial of procedural due process.
It is not too much to say that the kind
of hearing the Commission has sought
to give during these fifty-one years reflects the kind of hearing that the Commission's first chairman, Judge Cooley of
Michigan, thought it ought to give. Perhaps after all Judge Cooley's claim to
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enduring fame lies in the fact that he
as the Commission's first chairman laid
the foundations of the Commission's
work and thus really contributed to the
growth of American administrative law.
The Commission's approach to procedural due process has doubtless reflected the fact that the Commission in almost all its cases acts as a judge between
private interests. This is a characteristic of the cases before the Commission
that should not be overlooked. In almost
all cases the Commission has on one
side the railroads and on the other the
shippers or localities or commercial associations. In most cases the parties are
represented by lawyers. Thus we have
not had the questions now before us
arising out of the fact that in many instances the staff of an administrative
tribunal investigates, prosecutes, briefs
and argues before the tribunal itself.
It may be that it was the adversary
nature of the cases before the Commission that gave rise to the expression of
the Supreme Court (Inter. Com. Comm.
v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 88,
30 S.Ct. 651, 54 L.Ed. 946) that from
whatever standpoint the powers of the
Commission may be viewed, they touch
many interests and have great consequences, and they are expected to be exercised in the coldest neutrality.
But surely what is here said has equal
application to any administrative tribunal
that passes upon disputed questions, even
though such questions be new and novel
ones in the realm of the law.
There isn't any doubt that the Commission's reputation today is due in large
measure to the manner in which it conducts its hearings. The rules of pleading are of the simplest. The Commission said in its first annual report, and
undoubtedly Judge Cooley wrote it, that
it was the Commission's desire that practice and proceedings before it should be
in the simplest form possible consistent
with justice. Questions respecting evidence infrequently arise. The Commission has pointed out that it could not
conduct its proceedings if the hearsay
rule were strictly followed. My experience is that the Commission in matters

of evidence undertakes fairly to consider whether the evidence, to use the
language of the Supreme Court in the
Consolidated Edison Company case, has
a rational probative force. The Supreme Court has said that if any party
believes that hearsay evidence is really
objectionable, proper objection should be
made. Spiller v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co.,
253 U.S. 117, 40 S.Ct. 466, 64 L.Ed.
810.
It would seem that possibly the Commission is justified in relaxing the hearsay rule to a greater extent than those
tribunals which do not deal to the extent
that the Commission does with statistics
and figures taken from reports and records. For example, it might well be that
in a case involving a labor dispute, where
personal animosities and prejudices are
more likely to arise, the hearsay rule
could not in fairness to the parties be
relaxed to the extent that it is before the
Commission.
An example of such a situation is
found in the recent decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in National Labor
Relations Board v. Union Pacific Stages,
9 Cir., 99 F.2d 153. See also the decision of Associate Justice Stephens in
Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C.,
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, 68 App.D.C. 292,
96 F.2d 564.
And then we have the human factor.
In the Commission's long life it has built
up a personnel that for the most part is
efficient and expert. The examiners of
course differ in their capacities, their
balance, and their judgment, yet on the
whole, the personnel of the Commission
and its staff and its reputation for fairness and thoroughness justify the views
that have recently been expressed, if I
may quote Dean Landis in his recent
book on "The Administrative Process,"
that such a reputation attaching to a particular agency seeps through to the
judges and affects them in their treatment of its decisions. See also Making
Administrative Action Safe, by Professor J. D. Masters, Amer. Bar Ass'n
Journal, October, 1938, page 837.
I have appeared and tried a gi eat
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many cases before the Commission and
have followed many of them into the
courts. I do not know of any case in
which I thought that there had been a
denial of a fair hearing. The fact of
the matter is that the Supreme Court
has reversed the Commission only twice
because of a lack of procedural due
process. You are all familiar with the
Orient Division case, [U. S. v. Abilene
& So. Ry. Co.], 265 U.S. 274, 44 S.Ct.
565, 68 L.Ed. 1016, in which the court
set aside an order of the Commission because it rested in part upon data taken
from the annual reports filed with the
Commission but which were not formally
put in evidence and to which attention
was not otherwise specifically called.
In the Western Grain case, [Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. Co. v. U. S.], 284 U.S.
248, 52 S.Ct. 146, 76 L.Ed. 273, the court
found that the Commission had denied
to the railroads procedural due process
in refusing to grant them a rehearing in
a very important case, the record in
which had been closed for some considerable time before the Commission
had entered its decision.
It is true that there are a great many
cases in which there are dicta regarding
the requisites of a full hearing before
the Commission. I refer to only two of
them: the Baird case [Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Baird], 194 U.S. 25, 24
S.Ct. 563, 48 L.Ed. 860, which pointed
out that the Commission should not be
too narrowly constrained by technical
rules as to the admissibility of proof,
and the Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co.
case, [Interstate Commerce Comm. v.
Louisville & N. R. Co.], 227 U.S. 88, 33
S.Ct. 185, 57 L.Ed. 431, the language
in which has almost become a classic,
to the effect that the parties must be fully
apprised of the evidence submitted and
must be given an opportunity to crossexamine witnesses, and offer evidence in
explanation or rebuttal.
Not infrequently the hearings are too
long, but I think that this is one of the
reasons why the Commission stands well
in the eyes of those who are most familiar with its work. The questions presented are sometimes extremely compli-

cated, involving a thousand 'and one
competing interests. The stock example
is the Grain case in which the record
stretched to well over 100,000 pages.
The Supreme Court itself has said that
the prospect that a hearing may be a long
one is no justification for its denial if
justice requires it. Western Grain case,
284 U.S. 248, page 262, 52 S.Ct. 146,
150, 76 L.Ed. 273. See also Ohio Bell
Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81
L.Ed. 1093.
But the result is that no interested parties leave the hearings feeling that they
did not have an opportunity of explaining their own interests, and they may
have been selfish interests, to the Commission.
Mr. Commissioner Eastman recently
gave expression to a reasonable approach
to these questions. He said that we can
do a good deal to shorten and simplify
procedure, but that we cannot avoid it,
that on the whole, notwithstanding this
vexation, he believed it is well that this
is so, that in the long run it is the only
sure protection against arbitrary, or unprincipled, or unjust action, and that if a
tribunal has to tell why it does things
and can point to a record which supports its action, it cannot go far wrong
and survive.
The Supreme Court has just pointed
out (Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S.
1, page 20, 58 S.Ct. 773, 777, 999, 82
L.Ed. 1129) that the requirements of
fairness are not exhausted in the taking
or consideration of evidence but extend
to the concluding parts of the procedure
as well as to the beginning and intermediate steps. This brings up the form
and the fairness in which the written reports of the Commission are cast. A
casual examination of the Commission's
decisions will show the patience, time,
and care that have been put upon them
by the Commission's staff and by the
Commission itself. It is true that in
some cases the Supreme Court has admonished the Commission as it has the
lower courts that complete statements
showing the grounds upon which the determinations rest are necessary. You
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will recall that in two cases the orders of
the Commission were set aside because
of a lack of esseritial findings. Florida v.
United States, 282 U.S. 194, 51 S.Ct.
119, 75 L.Ed. 291, intra-state rates on
logs, and United States v. Baltimore &
0. R. Co., 293 U.S. 454, 55 S.Ct. 268,
79 L.Ed. 587, power reverse gears on
engines. But generally speaking the decisions of the Commission show the
grounds upon which their determinations
rest.
In one case (Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co.
v. United States, D.C., 5 F.Supp. 929)
a three-judge court in a unanimous decision set aside the Commission's order
requiring power reverse gears on engines because of the failure of the Commission, as shown by its report, to consider fairly all the pertinent testimonynot to pick out some of the facts, but to
weigh fairly and conscientiously all of
them. The decision was sustained on a
somewhat narrower ground in the Supreme Court (293 U.S. 454, 55 S.Ct.
268, 79 L.Ed. 587)-on the ground that
the findings were not sufficient.
I
thought of this decision when I read a
very recent decision of the Circuit Court
of Appeals in a Labor Board case. National Labor Relations Board v. Union
Pacific Stages, 9 Cir., 99 F.2d 153. Here
an order was set aside because of the
Board's failure to consider all the evidence. The Court said it did not construe the language in the Act providing
that the findings of the Board as to facts
if supported by evidence shall be conclusive, as compelling the acceptance of
findings arrived at by accepting part of
the evidence and totally disregarding other convincing evidence.
I realize how difficult it is for a person
who is not familiar with all the facts always to draw the right conclusions from
a reported case, but I do feel that these
two decisions themselves bring out one
of the problems that must be faced fairly and squarely by any administrative
tribunal. There must not only be a
fair hearing before the tribunal but
there must be a fair, impartial, and complete consideration of all the evidence.
This does not mean, as the Supreme

Court has pointed out, that the Board
must recite all the evidence.
The Commission is also to be commended I think for developing a technique in its procedure that has met with
the approval of parties who appear before the Commission. The procedure
that the Commission has worked out in
this respect has received implied approval of the Supreme Court in recent
cases. Morgan v. United States, 304
U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 999, 82 L.Ed. 1129;
National Labor Board v. Mackay R. &
Teleg. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 S.Ct. 904,
82 L.Ed. 1381. As you all know, very
few cases before the Commission are
heard by the commissioners themselves;
they are heard by examiners who make
tentative reports. The parties may except to these reports and replies to exceptions may be filed. When the case comes
to the Commission, therefore, the issues
are narrowed and the arguments directed
to specific findings and conclusions in the
proposed reports.
There is a rather novel procedure now
under the Motor Carriers Act, under
which these proposed reports become
final if no exceptions are filed by the
parties, and that the Commission itself
does not state it.
Chief Justice Hughes in the first decision in the Morgan case, 298 U.S. 468,
56 S.Ct. 906, 80 L.Ed. 1288, said that
the one who decides shall be bound in
good conscience to consider the evidence,
to be guided by that alone, and to reach
his conclusion uninfluenced by extraneous considerations which in other fields
might have play in determining purely
executive action-"does not preclude
practicable administrative procedure in
obtaining the aid of assistants in the department. Assistants may prosecute inquiries. Evidence may be taken by an
examiner. Evidence thus taken may be
sifted and analyzed by competent subordinates. Argument may be oral or
written. The requirements are not technical. But there must be a hearing in a
substantial sense. And to give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence, the officer who makes the deter-
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minations must consider and appraise the
evidence which justifies them. That duty
undoubtedly may be an onerous one, but
the performance of it in a substantial
manner is inseparable from the exercise
of the important authority conferred."
Pages 480, 481, 482, 56 S.Ct. page 911.
It is a fair statement that the Interstate Commerce Commission follows .the
principles herein announced. A world of
detail work is done by its staff, but in
the end we have the mind of the Commission on the issues presented.
There are cases in which the Commission's staff investigates the facts under
the direction of a bureau of the Commission, presents the evidence, and argues the cases before the Commission. I
believe it is a fair statement that in these
cases the Commission consciously or unconsciously is inclined to give very great
weight to the arguments of its own staff.
I do not ask you to take my word for
this, but I call your attention to the recent decision in Freight Forwarding Investigation, 229 I.C.C. 201, a decision
that very largely reflects the work of
the Commission's staff in developing the
facts. Mr. Commissioner Eastman's dissenting opinion shows to my mind some
of the fallacies urged upon the Commission by its own staff and adopted by the
Commission. I should state, however,
that there appeared in this particular proceeding counsel for the railroad companies, for the forwarders, and for the
shippers.
Perhaps one way out may be the plan
announced just a few day ago by the
Civil Aeronautical Authority in which
the Authority undertakes to achieve a
separation of the functions of prosecutor
and judge. It has set up an Economic
Compliance Division which will have the
duty of acting as advocate or prosecutor in behalf of the public interest in
all cases before the Authority. While
the Division will necessarily be responsible to the five-man Authority, the Authority will not undertake to interfere
with or control the action of the Division
but will leave it free to make its own
contentions on behalf of the public interest.

I have been much interested in what
has heretofore been said because it appears that a similar plan of organization
has already been put into effect in the
other administrative tribunals.
It seems to me, however, that there
ought to be a further condition and that
is that if the Division of the tribunal is
free to make its own contentions on behalf of the public interest, the tribunal
itself should be freed from any contact
with its investigating and prosecuting
arm in the consideration that the tribunal itself gives to the case, in the conclusions which it reaches, and the report
which it writes.
This plan carries out the thought that
Mr. Commissioner Aitchison of the Interstate Commerce Commission expressed in a recent address on "Reforming the Administrative Process" (address delivered at the annual convention
of the Association of Practitioners Before the Interstate Commerce Commission, held in Pittsburgh, October 6, 1938,
-October, 1938 issue of I. C. C. Practitioners' Journal, page 25). He considered the tendencies in administrative
action which are the subject of current-day criticism, including the confusion in rate-making, investigation,
prosecution, and the functions of the
judges, and said that every one of the
tendencies cited was within the power of
the offending agency to avoid, without
additional legislation. And he made this
significant statement (page 30): "And
the prophecy may be ventured that, with
the aid of existing powers of judicial
review, public opinion and the pride of
every administrative agency in having
its determinations sustained will suffice
to bring about any needed correction."
This has been touched upon by the
preceding speaker but I am giving you
my views from the standpoint of a person who is construing an administrative
act. A great many questions that arise
under the act are never passed on by the
Commission in its decided reports.
Here let me say that entirely too much
time has been 'devoted by students of the
law to judicial review of administrative decisions and not half enough time
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to the very problems we are considering
here today and which in the end are of
more practical importance. So far as
the Commission is concerned, out of the
hundreds of cases that it decides every
year a bare handful are taken to the
courts. We as lawyers ought to devote
more time to what an administrative
tribunal does and how it does it. That
the tide has turned is I think shown by
Professor Sharfman's epochal work on
the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Mr. Felix Frankfurter has recently
quoted a sentence from Judge Learned
Hand that after all the requirement of
due process is merely the embodiment of
the English sporting idea of fair play.
(Mr. Justice Holmes, by Felix Frankfurter). The Chief Justice in the last
decision in Morgan v. United States, 304
U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 999, 82 L.Ed. 1129,
used this same phrase: "the liberty and
property of the citizen shall be protected
by the rudimentary requirements of fair
play" (pages 14, 15, 58 S.Ct. page 775).
It does not seem to me that it would
be a difficult matter for any administrative tribunal to determine whether under
the facts in any case there has been this
rudimentary requirement of fair play. I
think that any lawyer before an administrative tribunal at the conclusion of the
case, if he considers the problem as dispassionately as he can, can himself determine whether there has been procedural due process, and whether the
whole approach of the Commission to the
problem before it and the decision itself
reflect the elements of fair play.
Of course in the last analysis it is the
force of public opinion that will determine the usefulness and life of administrative tribunals. I think they have all
got to justify themselves, as I deeply
feel the Interstate Commerce Commission has justified itself, in the eyes of
those who appear before them and who
come in actual contact with their work
and in the eyes of the public at large.
Here again I do not ask you to take my
opinion but the opinion of the shippers
of the country who have risen to the
defense of the Commission on several
recent occasions, the last one when a

committee appointed by the President
suggested that the Commission be dismembered and many of its functions divided among the executive departments.
There is a winning and a losing side of
course in every case that the Commission decides, but from the shippers'
standpoint the Commission stands as a
check on the power that the railroads
would otherwise possess.
It is clear that under present-day conditions administrative tribunals are necessary instruments of a democracy and
that unless these economic conflicts in
a complicated social structure can be
solved by some rule of law, there may
be no alternative except recourse to arbitrary power. An administrative body
can make itself a real servant of a democratic way of life.
It was said of Judge Cooley that he
had made the Commission what its creators never contemplated-a tribunal of
justice in a field and for a class of questions where all was chaos before. There
isn't any doubt in my mind that this
can be done for other classes of questions involving economic disputes and
social relationships if the administrative
tribunals can bring to themselves the
confidence of those who appear before
them and the public at large.
Perhaps it may not be out of place
to refer to some views that have recently been expressed on this subject.
Mr. Alvin Johnson, Professor of Economics at Yale University, in the current number of The Yale Review, after
paying a compliment to the administration of the Labor Board Act goes on to
say however that the Act itself presents
a color of partiality through failing to
set apart the function of investigation
and of prosecution from the function of
deciding cases at issue, that we have the
scandal of witnessing an even boxing
match between a government organ and
a big industry.
Professor Gardner of the Harvard
Law School in a recent review of "The
Administrative Process" by Dean Landis, suggests that in some of the things
there said we have a re-assertion of the
antique conception of royal power. That
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this conception of royal power has been
advocated on behalf of the commissions
is shown by the decisions of the courts.
It is only necessary to refer to two of
them. In the well-known Louisville &
Nashville R. R. Co. case, [Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville &
N. R. Co.], 227 U.S. 88, 33 S.Ct. 185,
57 L.Ed. 431, it was argued on behalf of
the government that where the Interstate Commerce Commission expresses
the opinion that a rate is unreasonable,
an order based on such an opinion is
conclusive and can not be set aside even
if the finding is wholly without substantial evidence to support it. I think this
shows how far the zeal of the government to win a case will carry it. The
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Lamar, refused to endow the
Commission with any such royal power.
But substantially the same contention
was more recently made by the Federal
Communications Commission when it
urged that all it had to do to give binding effect to its order was to make the
stark finding one way or the other that
public convenience and necessity would
be served. The Court said that no commission exercising the judicial function
ought to render a decision without knowing the grounds therefor, and that a
statement of these grounds must neces-

sarily be drawn from the facts found.
The order of the Federal Communications Commission was upheld, but the
case is significant as indicating the argument advanced on behalf of the Communications
Commission.
Missouri
Broadcasting Corp. v. F. C. C., United
States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia,' 68 App.D.C. 154, 94 F.2d
623. See also Saginaw Co. v. F. C. C.,
68 App.D.C. 282, 96 F.2d 554, 555.
Perhaps these newer administrative
tribunals could have learned much had
they given some time and thought to procedure before the Interstate Commerce
Commission, its own decisions touching
that procedure, and the decisions of the
courts reviewing orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. I could
never understand, for example, upon
what theory the National Bituminous
Coal Commission assumed that it could
fix coal prices without giving the man
who produced the coal or the consumer
who paid for it a hearing.
What Messrs. Johnson and Gardner
have said may well be taken to be straws
in the wind, and to suggest to administrative tribunals from the oldest to the
youngest that they can establish themselves in the Nation's confidence only
by following the Anglo-Saxon tradition
of fair play.

RALPH HORWEEN
Formerly associated with the Petroleum Administration

President Arant, Ladies and Gentlemen: I warned Dean Arant that the
subject I was to speak on was not directly in point to the very important
questions which you have been discussing
here today. Nevertheless he suggested
that you might be interested in, if not
entertained by a recital of a few of the
episodes which occurred during the
building up of the first federal administrative agency in connection with the
oil industry which is functioning today.
Most of the administrative work in
the oil industry is done by the state administrative bodies in the oil producing

states, but not all the oil producing states
have administrative bodies, and that is
the trouble.
One of the reasons I think you may
be interested in this subject matter is
that, perhaps, sooner or later, if the
problem is ever attacked in a comprehensive way, and settled on a national
basis, it can only be done by a federal administrative body with ample powers
under a statute.
In tracing this bit of dramatic history, however, I do not think you will
get the most out of it without a little
background of the oil industry and the
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complexities of the problems which
arose.
Our present
Oil is irreplaceable.
known reserves, recoverable at approximate present day costs, would last us for
twelve to fifteen years, at the current
rate of production,-about one billion
barrels per year. We have, roughly, 25
per cent to 30 per cent of the world's
known reserves, and produce 62 per cent
of all the oil produced in the world.
There are a few inexorable laws governing the accumulation and production
of oil. Crude oil is found in sedimentary
rocks of very ancient geologic basins.
It is always associated with salt water.
The sedimentary deposits on the floor of
these basins are arranged in alternate
layers consisting of porous sandstones
or limestones (called reservoir rocks or
oil sands) and impervious shales (called
cap rocks). Oil accumulates where foldings or other non-conformities create a
dome or other form of trap, but it did not
originate there. Oil and gas probably
originated in old seabeds, and after generating high pressures, migrated through
the porous rocks or sands until the whole
mixture was trapped in an anticline, or
dome, or fault structure under the impervious cap rock. Sometimes there is
a free gas cap. The greater the pressure
in the reservoir the greater the amount
of gas which is held in solution in the
oil. The oil is not in a lake or a river,
but occupies the spaces in the porous
sands, in association with gas. These
accumulations are known to occur from
a few hundred feet to almost three miles
below the surface. How much deeper
they are no one knows.
Of course, actual geological conditions
are very complex with complicated foldings, faults and other non-conformities.
The productive sands vary in thickness;
there may be several producing sands in
the same structure. Porosity and the
oil bearing capacity of the sands vary
tremendously. Individual pools range in
size from very small ones to the gigantic
East Texas field which has an area of
some 130,000 producing acres, and an
estimated oil content of six billion bar-

rels, of which more than one billion has
already been extracted.
The gas, oil and water in the reservoir are confined under pressure in a
state of equilibrium; the natural pressure in the reservoir, or what is known
as reservoir energy, is stored in the solution of gas in the oil, in the free gas under pressure, and in the water pressing
against the oil on the flanks of the structure.
The production of oil is dependent
upon the simple principle of creating a
point of lowered pressure in the reservoir. When the well penetrates the cap
rock, the pressure equilibrium is disturbed. The reservoir becomes in reality
a gas and hydraulic engine forcing the
liquids and gases to move through the
pores of the sands to the point of lowered pressure at the well bore. The
lowered pressure permits gas in the oil
to expand and comes out of solution,
just exactly as the gas escapes from
charged soda water when you release
the pressure by taking the cap off the
bottle. This expansion of the gas in solution, together with the expansive force of
the free gas and the pressure of the water against the flanks, drives the oil
through the rocks to the well and up to
the surface. The gas which is held in
the oil by the pressures is the prime motive force for the extraction of oil from
the reservoir.
In flush fields, where the natural pres-"
sure in the reservoir is high enough,
the mere opening of the well valve is
sufficient to cause migration to the well
and to lift the oil to the surface. These
are the gushers. When the pressure has
been depleted, the lifting of. oil to the
surface by pumps creates the necessary
pressure differential to cause the migration of free oil to the bottom of the
well.
Besides furnishing motive power, the
gas in solution in the oil performs an7
other vital function. It makes the oil
lighter, less viscous and more fluid, so
that it can permeate through the pores of
the sands to the well.
As the pressure in the reservoir declines, more dissolved gas comes out of
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the oil, leaving it thicker and increasingly difficult to move. When pressures decline to a certain point, there will be so
little gas left in solution that the oil
clings to the sands and can never be recovered, except by very expensive methods.
The total reservoir energy and the
total volume of oil and gas confined in
any oil pool are definitely limited. The
location of the reservoir has no relationship whatsoever to the lines of property ownership on the surface. However, the drainage of oil and gas and
the depletion of the reservoir energy
through wells drilled into the common
reservoir directly control the total
amount of oil which can be recovered,
and determine the total amount of reservoir energy which can be used to produce oil from the reservoir.
Oil in a pool is never exhausted. The
gas energy is exhausted and the reservoir is abandoned.
The amount of ultimate recovery from
any oil pool depends primarily upon
the use and maintenance of reservoir gas
pressures, not only to furnish the energy
necessary to raise the oil, but also to
keep the oil in a sufficiently fluid condition to get it out of the sands at all.
Wide open flow, or too rapid flow, has
this effect: Excessive amounts of gas
are released, which quickly depletes the
reservoir pressure; dissolved gas leaves
the o; the oil then becomes thicker and
tends to remain where it lies in the formation; oil moves out through the well
faster than it can be replaced by oil further away from the well, and salt water
(more fluid than oil), rushes into this
low pressure area, drowning the well and
blocking 6ff other oil from reaching it.
This is known as "channelling" or "coning."
The important legal factors are the
leasing system and the "law of capture."
Because of the hazardous and speculative character of finding and producing
oil, the operator does not usually own the
fee, but acquires the land under a lease
by which he gets only the right to explore, drill and produce oil, in consideration of his agreement to pay the lessor a

royalty when, as and if oil is produced.
Rarely is the surface over an oil pool
held by one or even a few owners or lessees. Even though one interest may hold
a large part of the surface under lease,
his acreage is usually checkerboarded
over the pool. The ownership of the
royalty interest is almost invariably held
by a large number of individuals.
Very early in the game the courts held
that, since the real consideration for the
lessor having leased his property was
the royalty to be paid out of the production of oil, the lessor (or the royalty owner if the lessor had transferred his royalty interest) could compel the lessee to
drill and produce at least as rapidly as
other producers in the same pool, in order to protect the leased land from drainage. The penalty was forfeiture for
failure to live up to the implied covenants
of diligent operation.
The second legal factor is the so-called
"law of capture." It is briefly this: A
producer may drill as many wells as he
pleases and may take and keep all the
oil and gas which he can produce from
his wells, regardless of whether he
wastefully blows gas into the air, drains
oil and gas from another man's property
or uses more than his share of the reservoir energy in the entire pool; the only
recourse of other surface owners in the
same pool to protect their properties
against drainage and destruction of reservoir energy is to drill offset wells and
produce in like manner, in the hope of
setting up counteracting drainage. The
cost of drilling such superfluous wells,
the waste of oil and gas, the plundering
of reservoir energy, and the consequent
destruction of the correlative property
rights of all the co-owners in the common
pool are completely ignored by this primitive dogma "go thou and do likewise."
This principle was first laid down by
the courts of Pennsylvania in the early
days. Although there was ample common law precedent for a rule of law
which would protect the correlative
rights of land owners (analogous to the
principle of shoring up), so little was
known of the nature of oil and gas in
those days that the courts conjured up a
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picture of a running stream below the in the pool, because they must do likewise
ground, and followed the common law in order to prevent drainage, loss of ulanalogy of percolating waters and wild timate recovery and forfeiture. It is a
run on the bank, except that each deposanimals.
Although adopted in deep ignorance of itor, in addition to trying to get his own
the physical laws and enginering prin- money out, does his best to get the other
ciples applicable to oil and gas, the law fellow's as well; all of them must sell
of capture became so firmly established their oil as fast as it is produced, regardby constant judicial repetition that the less of the demand or the price; no one
courts speak of it as a "vested property can reduce his production unless every
right."
Unbelievable as it may seem, other producer in the same pool does
If some sensible producer
this shibboleth has been held responsible likewise.
for the colossal waste and for the peri- should want to produce more slowly, he
odic demoralization in the oil industry. would not only have his oil drained away
The basis of the doctrine is supposed- by the others (and with no recourse),
ly the impossibility of obtaining reason- but he would be in constant danger of
ably accurate knowledge of the sub-sur- forfeiture by his lessor. Oil from newly
face movements of oil and gas. Never- found flush fields of low production cost
theless, when the lessor sued for dam- was constantly offered at progressively
ages or forfeiture, claiming breach of lower prices, and wiped out of the marimplied covenants of diligence, the courts ket the wells of settled production until
have not hesitated to receive such evi- these new flush fields literally "blew their
dence as was available to show the heads off," and went on the pump. The
amount of drainage sustained by the resulting waste was almost incalculable,
lessor because of the lessee's failure to not only in the flush fields, but because of
protect against drainage.
the premature abandonment of stripper
Now the economic factors: There is wells, and 40 per cent of our reserves are
a large initial investment in the drilling under these stripper wells of settled proof a well. The cost of operating a well duction. Wells were located, not with
in a flush pool is negligible-merely the reference to position on the structure,
opening of a valve. A low price for oil, not for purposes of efficient drainage,
strange as it may seem, results in in- but by the purely accidental location of
creased production,-the producer striv- property lines. Wells bottomed in the
ing for the same number of dollars to gas cap were blowing gas to high heaven
meet his overhead costs, regardless of the in the hope of getting some oil out, and
number of barrels of oil. Because of the wells drilled in the oil belt were flowed
cumulative effect of the leasing system, wide open in the mad race to drain the
the law of capture and the physical fac- other fellow. It is safe to say that in
tors, it is always to the greatest economic many of our great fields which were deadvantage for an individual operator to veloped in this way, only about 10 per
drill more wells and to produce his wells cent to 15 per cent of the oil content was
at a faster rate than his neighbors who recovered. In the absence of legislative
also draw from the same common reser- protection, operators were compelled to
voir; because he can increase the total drill thousands of unnecessary offset
amount of oil which he can drain from wells under threat of drainage and forthe common pool at their expense; and feiture of their leases.
Even today,
he can decrease his costs of production about $100,000,000 is the annual bill for
per barrel by producing a greater volume unnecessary offset wells. Based on our
of oil under conditions of flush produc- annual production of one billion barrels,
tion. He also gets an advantage over his this is a production tax of 10 per cent
neighbors by using more than his just for the privilege of worshipping the law
share of the reservoir energy. The one of capture. The consumer will pay it,
who flows his wells at the most rapid sooner or later.
rate sets the pace for the other owners
Of course, the obvious answer is that
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the pool is the economic unit, and should
be operated as such, with a division of
the oil, after it is brought up, in proportion to the oil in place under each holding. This has been done in this country
in a few fields by agreement, and is the
uniform practice in the big fields in the
Near East and elsewhere. Wells are
drilled for efficient drainage, and for no
other reason. The gas pressure is conserved by proper rates of withdrawal;
the wells flow naturally for almost the
entire life of the field, and from two to
four times as much oil is recovered at
one-half to one-third of the cost.
This is the intelligent way of assuring
to each owner his just share, based on
modern engineering knowledge. Under
the law of capture, he can only try to get
his just share by drilling offset wells and
producing as fast as his neighbor,-at a
terrific cost, in the waste of natural resources, and expense of utterly unnecessary wells.
New Mexico-Oklahoma
Of course the application of modern
engineering in repressuring or reflooding
operations in order to increase the
amount of ultimate recovery is impossible except in a unitized operation.
Oklahoma enacted the first comprehensive conservation statute in 1915, 52
Okl.St.Ann. § 271 et seq. This legislation prohibited waste in the production
of oil and empowered the Corporation
Commission to make the necessary orders to prevent waste by the regulation of
production methods, by curtailing total
production to market demand, and compelling ratable taking by owners in a common pool. The statute defined waste to
mean physical waste both below ground
and above ground, and also economic
waste arising from production in excess
of storage and transportation facilities
and in excess of market demand. Things
went along fairly smoothly until the orgy
of the Oklahoma City field in 1930, coupled with the immense uncontrolled production in the East Texas field in the
same year, broke the price of crude oil
to 25 cents or 30 cents a barrel. There

was an interlude of martial law in which
the governor shut down all the wells. In
the meantime the Champlin case [Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm.], 286
U.S. 210, 52 S.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062,
86 A.L.R. 403] reached the Supreme
Court of the United States and the power of the Corporation Commission was
upheld.
Texas had a similar law with the exception, however, that the statute, while
expressly authorizing the Railroad Commission to curtail and prorate production,
contained the proviso that waste should
not be construed to mean economic
waste. The Commission employed its
powers very sparingly until there was a
sudden cry for conservation when the excess production of the East Texas field
cracked the price of crude oil to 10 cents
a barrel in 1930 and 1931.
The history of the proration of oil production in Texas by the Railroad Commission is a fascinating story in administrative law. It illustrates the tremendous powers and influence of such administrative body and presents an illuminating picture of the Commission's
conflict with the Federal courts and their
final reconciliation.
For two years the Federal courts
struck down order after order of the
Commission, without, however, holding
the statute to be invalid. No sooner was
one order enjoined than the Commission
held new hearings, recorded more testimony, made new findings and new orders. By the summer of 1931, production in this great new field alone reached
one million barrels a day. Reservoir
pressures were dropping in the traditional fashion; the freebooters flowed their
wells wide open to steal their neighbor's
oil, the law of capture reigned supreme,
and the legitimate producers were tempted to operate in the same way in self defense, and crude oil was selling for 10
cents a barrel,-less than the price of
drinking water. The engineers testified
almost unanimously that withdrawals in
excess of 400,000 barrels a day would
plunder the field by reducing pressures
prematurely and permitting the irregular
intrusion of salt water, which in turn
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v',ould reduce the ultimate recovery from as field to get evidence to prosecute imthe field by colossal amounts. In Au- mediately any violations.
gust, 1931, immediately after the Federal
As the first step in the conservation
courts enjoined an order of the Commis- program under the Code, the Bureau of
sion, Governor Sterling declared martial Mines set the production quota for each
law and ordered the troops to shut in all state, and the Secretary put pressure on
the wells in the field. The Federal courts the industry throughout the country to
enjoined the Governor and his Adjutant raise th price of crude oil to $1.00 a barGeneral. Pending appeal to the Supreme rel. (To make possible compliance with
Court, however, the Governor left the curtailment and sane practices.)
This
troops in the field as peace officers, sub- was done. The next essential objective
ject to the orders of the Commission, and was to raise the price of gasoline to a
not as soldiers subject to the orders of level commensurate with this crude price,
In December, as recommended in the Code: 181/2 to 1.
the Chief Executive.
1932, the Supreme Court affirmed the in- At $1.00 a barrel for crude, this was an
junction.
average price of 5.4 cents for all grades
Under an amended statute, the Com- of gasoline. Of course this was a bonanmission finally made its first proration za for the hot oil operators in East Texas
order for the East Texas field that was because they were smart enough to sell
sustained by the Federal court in April, illegal oil at prices ranging from 30 cents
1933.
to 60 cents a barrel, whereas previously
During all this period, however, and they got only 10 cents a barrel for it.
also after the date of the first valid orLegal crude was $1.00 a barrel and legal
der, hot oil production in amounts esti- gasoline was bringing between 31/2 cents
mated up to 500,000 barrels per day was
and 4 cents while hot gasoline was bringcoming out of the field. The national
ing around 2 cents. The enforcement of
price-structure for oil was based on East
simply non-existent. The FedTexas crude at 10 cents to 25 cents a bar- 9(c) was
in East Texas were soon resleuths
eral
rel. Quite apart from the waste in the
such
a joke that, by way of
garded
as
East Texas field itself, the economic cost
local
papers .carried adit
in,
rubbing
was still greater. Older fields either had
the
sale of false whisfor
vertisements
to lose their markets or open wide to
Dicks.
Federal
for
as
disguises
kers
meet this kind of competition. Oklahobarwas
425,000
field
allowable
(The
ma could not produce rationally if Texas
potential
daily
field's
day-the
rels
per
ran wild, and as a result, the Oklahoma
proration orders could not be enforced. perhaps 10,000,000. Hot production 400,Curtailment, plus 10 cent oil, spelled 000.)
The state of Texas had a very elabobankruptcy. The public got cheaper gasoline temporarily,-but the cost was yet rate tender system. A "tender" is an oil
country name for a shipping permit.
to be paid.
Then came the NRA legislation, with The producer who wanted to ship had to
get a permit from the Railroad CommisSection 9 (c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 709 (c).
9(c) provided: The President is au- sion upon making a showing that his oil
The Railroad
thorized to prohibit the shipment in in- was legally produced.
terstate commerce of petroleum or its Commission was apparently helpless as
products produced in violation of state to oil tendered for interstate shipment,
law, with penalties of fine and imprison- because of court rulings that it had no
ment for violation of the statute or regu- jurisdiction to interfere with interstate
lations issued thereunder. The Presi- commerce. The field was so large, the
dent, by executive order, did so prohibit, number of producers was so great, there
-and designated the Secretary of the In- was so much money at stake-well, it
terior, as his agent. Regulations under was common gossip that tenders on un9(c) were made, and a force of Federal pedigreed oil could be had at 20 cents a
investigators swarmed into the East Tex- barrel-if you had the proper legal rep-
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resentation. Most of the violators didn't
even bother to get tenders.
The Federal regulations required each
producer, each of the 85 refineries in the
field, each of the numerous gathering systems and interconnecting pipe line systems to file elaborate reports, and to
make records available for inspection.
They also provided that each bill-of-lading for interstate shipment must be accompanied by a sworn affidavit that the
products tendered were legally produced.
The form was designated as Form "0.
E.S." These were soon affectionately
known in the field as the "Oh Yeah" affidavits. Thousands of them were solemnly filed with the railroad signed
"Harold L. Ickes, Franklin D. Roosevelt" and others, and showing the consignee as "George, the Fifth" and "John
D. Rockefeller" and so the game went
merrily on.
The field was dotted with hundreds of
huge open air storage pits, which were
merely earth embankments, holding several hundred thousand barrels. (Best estimates were that some 20 million barrels
were stored right in the field in this
way.) These bottomless pits were always mysteriously full, no matter how
much oil was pumped out to the refineries in the field, and a check-up by Federal agents was revealing that hot oil was
run into them by concealed underground
connections from hundreds of wells.
This, and the fact that the hot oil refiners kept no records, made it impossible to make proof against them without
an actual check of their operations. So
some of the boys went into the Federal
courts and got an injunction against the
Federal agents coming on their property,
on the grounds that 9(c) was unconstitutional as beyond the commerce power.
This was the Panama Refining case
[Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan], 293 U.
S. 388, 55 S.Ct.,241, 79 L.Ed. 446. The
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, but
left the injunction in force pending certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Although thus stymied, the Federal
Government tried again to protect the legitimate industry from the competition
of stolen oil. The allowable was 28 bar-

rels a day for each well; many hot wells
were running 10,000 barrels a day, and
the unequal intrusion of salt water was
drowning out big sections of the field.
The law-abiding producers were about to
open up their wells in self-defense unless
the theft of their oil was stopped-and
East Texas, the world's largest pool,
would have gone the way of so many
others.
To bolster up the price of gasoline and
as a desperate attempt to stop hot oil,
during the spring and summer of 1934
under the authorization of the Petroleum
Code there were a series of so-called
"buying programs" (the predecessors of
the alleged buying programs of the Madison indictments). Under express urging sanction and authority of the Administrator (which meant a command in
those days) a group of the larger companies, by agreement, purchased so-called
"distress gasoline" from independent refiners who had been deprived of their
markets by the flood of bootleg gasoline
from East Texas. In the East Texas
field, too, the program was carried on by
purchases from all the refiners there who
would sign the approved form of contract. Some, but not all, signed up.
These contracts were in effect a bribe and
provided that their gasoline would be
purchased at a fat price on condition that
they abide by the proration orders of the
Texas Railroad Commission, and made
the required reports. But the higher
price merely brought on increased hot
oil production by those who did not sign
up. It was like trying to bail out the
ocean, and after many thousands of cars
of gasoline were purchased over a period
of about nine months, the attempt was
abandoned.
Stymied again, the Federals, in October, 1934, tried a new scheme. Under
the authority of Section 9 (c) a new set
of regulations was issued which prohibited any interstate carrier from shipping
or accepting for interstate shipment any
crude or refined oil from the East Texas
field unless the shipment was accompanied by a Federal shipping permit. These
were known as Federal tenders. The
regulations set up a so-called Federal
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Tender Board to hold hearings in the
East Texas field and to issue such Federal permits if the applicant demonstrated that the shipment was manufactured
out of legally produced oil.
This was administrative law de luxe.:
The statute did not provide for any
method of review; consequently the only
remedy available to persons who differed
with the Board or its authority was by
injunction in the Federal courts. Although the Federals had been enjoined in
the Panama case from coming on the
properties of the plaintiffs, by this simple expedient the same plaintiffs were
compelled to come before the Board with
records and testimony to prove the legal
origin of their oil if it were to move out
of the state-and there was no market
available in Texas.
As one of the three members of this
administrative body, the scenes are still
vivid in my mind. We held forth in a
one-story shack, hastily nailed together,
in a thickly wooded part of this tremendous field, close to the same building in
which the Texas Railroad Commission
had its local office and held its hearings
for state tenders. We soon learned a
few things about administrative law as
practiced in Texas. Anyone had a standing to be heard. Picture a room blue
with smoke, a rough table at one end,
and filled with a dense crowd of producers, drilling rough-necks, oil company
scouts, pirates, state investigators and a
general crowd of the oil fraternity. The
costumes were picturesque. Oil derricks
were in sight all over the place. In the
hearings for state tenders it was a common occurrence, when an application for
a tender was presented, for a dozen people in the crowd to shout that the so-andso had been accused last year of running
hot oil or running out hot gasoline at
night and that therefore his present application should be refused. Then the
free-for-all argument was on until the
local officer of the Texas Railroad Commission would call a halt and make his
ruling.
A storm of injunction suits in the Vederal courts hit us when it became clear,
12

after the first few hearings, that we were
going to stand on two principles: First
that the Federal Board was not bound by
the finding of the state Board as to the
legality of the oil tendered, but would
rely on its own investigation as well.
(The hot oil group were pretty well identified.) The only penalty provided in
the Texas statute for violation of the
proration orders was a maximum fine of
$1,000 for each offense. Violators, having paid a fine of $1,000 for having run
150,000 barrels of hot oil, applied for a
state tender for the shipment (either in
the form of crude or refined products),
solemnly taking the position that since
they had paid the fine there was nothing
more illegal about this oil. The state
courts actually compelled the Commission by mandamus, to issue tenders. The
Federal Board, however, was unable to
distinguish between hot oil and the same
oil anointed by the payment of $1,000
fine. Federal tenders were refused. Secondly, the Federal Board adopted the socalled co-mingling theory. Due to the
millions of barrels of oil stored in open
pits with no pedigree (and everyone
knew they could not be emptied), it was
a simple matter for the hot oil refiners
to scramble up, in the figures of their refining operations, a little legal oil with the
unpedigreed oil and to obtain state tenders for shipments out of the co-mingled
mass. The Federal Board put the burden on the applicant to segregate the legal molecules from the hot molecules in
the co-mingled mass. Since no one was
able to solve this problem of chemical
geneology, the findings were: "Tender
refused."
Then came the decision of the Supreme Court in the Panama Refining case
on January 8, 1935. A month later Congress passed the so-called Connolly Hot
Oil Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 715 et seq. A
Federal Tender Board still functions in
the East Texas field. The field allowable
has been held to about 425,000 barrels a
day ever since, and by the slow equalized
withdrawals, probably a billion barrels of
recoverable reserves have been saved
from destruction. Hot oil is no more.
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President Arant, Ladies and Gentlemen: The question before us is, to what
extent is administrative action efficient,
and particularly to what extent does it
protect private personal and property
rights as demanded by constitutional provisions and our general Anglo-American
concepts of justice.
It is natural for common law lawyers
to test the procedures of administrative
agencies by the extent to which they correspond with the practices of the ordinary courts of justice with which they
are familiar. Nevertheless a vital difference exists between the two types of
bodies. A court of justice is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction
is appealed to, undertaking on its own
part none of the burden of preparing and
presenting the cause, and rendering its
decision only on the case as presented to
it by the parties litigant. The function
of most administrative tribunals is much
more dynamic than this. They are not
mere substitutes for courts of law. The
administrative tribunals are invested by
legislative mandate with the positive duty
of executing and carrying into effect certain public policies and orders. The National Labor Relations Board is not
merely a court to decide disputes between
employers and employees. By statute it
"is empowered

.

.

to prevent any

person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice affecting commerce," and
the Board itself is the party complainant in proceedings before it. Failure to
appreciate this positive dynamic character of administrative law is to miss its
very essence and 'reason for existence.
But administrative tribunals possess a
power far greater than that of the ordinary executive agent. They not only investigate and prosecute. They also decide and, in view of the limited court
review permissible, with practical finality. In this phase of their functioning
they act as courts. There is therefore a
mingling, contrary to the principles of
the separation of governmental powers,

of the executive and judicial functions,
and a violation of that ancient precept
of the law that no man should be a
judge in his own cause. The principle
back of these doctrines should not, I believe, lightly be dismissed as outmoded
and inapplicable to our present economic
and governmental structure. Any individual who has at one and the same time
the duty of prosecuting and judging,
labors under a psychological handicap
which. may either dull his zeal as an
advocate or warp his judgment as an
adjudicator. Many proposals have been
made for separation within our administrative organization of the executive
and judicial functions. In large administrative bodies, such as N. L. R. B.,
this may be possible. In the smaller
state commissions such a separation of
personnel would, however, involve a
duplication of effort and an expense that
seems impractical. The matter is one,
however, to which continuing attention
should be given.
In adopting a procedure for the conduct of their business, administrative
bodies have been singularly unhampered.
Legislatures have often declared that
their procedures shall be informal and
free from legal technicalities. While it
is universally admitted that an individual
who is affected in his private right by
action of government should at some
time in the proceeding have an opportunity to be heard, it is only recently that
much attention has been given to the
question of just what constitutes this
loosely defined "right to a hearing."
With that question courts and administrative bodies are today wrestling.
May I be so bold as to make a few suggestions ?
Analyzed, the so-called "right to a
hearing" consists I believe of at least
five cardinal primary rights. (1) The
party affected by the tribunal's action
must have the right to present his own
case. (2) The party affected must be
advised of, and be given opportunity to
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meet the case against him. This is what
was decided in the second opinion of the
Supreme Court in Morgan v. United
States. Whether this notice be given by
pleadings as at common law, by the making of oral or written arguments, or by
the device of a tentative 'report to which
exceptions may be made, is apparently
immaterial. (3) As a corollary to the
right of the parties to present evidence
and to know the evidence against them
comes the third principle, that the administrative tribunal must render its decision solely on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected. Interstate Commerce Comm. v.
L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S.Ct.
185, 57 L.Ed. 431. Only by confining
the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the
latter be protected in their right to know
and meet the case against them. This requirement quite definitely regards the administrative tribunals as of a quasi-judicial character. It should not, however,
detract from their duty actively to see
that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose to use whatever evidence is
available, whether presented by the parties to the hearing or not. The dilemma
is usually surmounted by having the
Commission's own agents or deputies
make investigations and then as witnesses testify concerning what they have
discovered. (4) Closely connected with
the third principle is the fourth which
was declared in the first Morgan decision, (298 U.S. 468, 56 S.Ct. 906, 80
L.Ed. 1288) to the effect that the person
who is vested by statute with the duty
of deciding, must act on his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. This requirement,
if strictly applied, would paralyze most
of our large commissions. The volume
of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads themselves
personally to decide all controversies
coming before their commissions. Fortunately an easy solution of the difficulty
lies in statutory authority to examiners

or other subordinates within the department to render final decisions with a
right of appeal to the Commission itself
if desired. (5) Lastly, the administrative board should in all controversial
questions render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know how the various issues involved were determined and the reasons for the decision rendered. An order
in the words of a statute applicable to
any one of a thousand different situations, is not only unfair to the parties,
but a dangerous incentive to hasty and
ill-considered action by the tribunal itself.
These hasty generalizations are not offered in any dogmatic mood, but merely
as foci about which discussion of administrative procedure may center. I am
not sanguine that anything but a very
general uniformity can be secured. The
tasks that the various commissions have
imposed on them vary so widely that no
one procedure can fit them all, and the
procedure of course must be bent to the
task, and not the task to the procedure.
I am convinced, however, that the time
has come for all persons interested in the
use of administrative law-administrators, practitioners, academic men-to
consider seriously and laboriously the
question of what procedures, if any, are
common and essential in government
through the administrative agency or
commission. How can that procedure be
both efficient and at the same time protect the private rights of the parties
within the orbit of the Commission's jurisdiction ?
There is much inertia in undertaking a
task of this magnitude. Practical administrators are primarily interested in
performing the task imposed upon them
by statutory mandate quickly and efficiently without complication or delay.
Procedural requirements are sometimes
regarded as unnecessary legalistic obstructions to progress towards the objective they seek to achieve. This view is
often expressed by lay writers. In a report of the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners concerning public service commission pro-
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cedure, a professor at Illinois-not a
member of the law faculty-is quoted as
saying, "The ultimate and only socially
justifiable criterion by which the effectiveness of such regulation should be
judged is its social consequences. Results are the major consideration. The
method by which such results are attained is of secondary or incidental significance-a mere means to an end. No
regulatory agency can properly be held
accountable for socially desirable results
unless it is free in respect to the procedures necessary to secure those results."
The proponents of an administrative
procedure which would omit many of the
most significant safeguards against arbitrary action that the common law has
thrown about our ordinary courts, usually justify their position by reliance on
the highly expert character of the individuals who head and staff our regulatory commissions. It is inferred that
ordinary judicial procedures are inapplicable to a personnel which possesses
such a superior insight into and such a
refined, scientific and professional approach to the extremely difficult and technical problems with which they are confronted. That there is considerable truth
in this position when a commission is
dealing with routine matters not of immediate pressing concern to the people
and capable of fairly definite proof or
disproof, I do not deny. I doubt, however, whether such an admission should
be made concerning highly controversial
social and economic questions in which
a great portion of the public having a
vital stake, such as those involved in the
prescribing of rates for public utilities
and in regulating relations between capital and labor. I am somewhat doubtful

whether an absolute scientific objectivity
can be attributed even to administrative
commissions "appointed by law and informed by experience" though they be.
Today it is quite common-and salutary
-to point out that the judges even of
our highest courts are not deities, but
only human beings, each with his distinct
social and economic preferences and
prejudices. Do not the titular heads
and the technical staffs of governmental
commissions and boards also have their
own pretty definite economic and social
views? There is need perhaps to caution
some of our publicists that they must not
commit the error of attributing to our administrative commissions a godlike omniscience of right and wrong which we
now see cannot be attributed to the ordinary courts of justice.
What I have just said has no reference to the remarks of any of the speakers who have preceded me, nor is it an
attack on administrative tribunals in general, nor on any administrative tribunal
in particular. It is simply to combat a
view which I have too often heard expressed which regards as unimportant
the formulation of an administrative procedure which will preserve for the private individual his right to present his
own case, to know the claim against
him, and to be advised of the reasons for
the decision made concerning him.
From meetings like the present one may
grow, I hope, a cooperative effort to design an administrative process which will
both be efficient in the performance of
governmental tasks and at the same time
duly regardful of private right. An administrative process of that type is the
only one which has any place in our
liberal, democratic form of government.
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I want to talk about the speakers who
preceded me. I am going to start with
the last and go up.
I want to take issue right away with
Professor Brown on two points. The
first point is that too frequently, in dealing with this problem of administrative
procedure, dealing with the problem of
the criticism of administrative tribunals,
we contrast a systeim of administrative
justice with a very ideal system of judicial justice, which all of us know does
not exist.
I think, as Mr. Madden and Mr. Lane
might bear me out, the problem of the
judge as a partisan is a problem that is
with us. Anybody who has had to plan
the legal strategy of litigating a single issue throughout the country, picks his
courts and picks his judges. I don't
think we ought to forget those things
when we deal with this problem of administrative justice, because that partisanship that judges have revealed is
one of the reasons for the existence of
this thing called administrative justice.
The very fact that the judges too frequently have been partisan on certain issues has led the legislatures to entrust
the formulation and the definition of
these issues to tribunals other than
courts.
In the field of labor law, that was partly the raison d'tre for a body like the
National Labor Relations Board, not
only the desire to acquire expertness, and
it has expertness, from which springs its
capacity to contribute to the development
of the relationships between capital and
labor. But loyalties to the ideas embodied in the legislation is also a reason for
administrative tribunals. The desire for
a Granger viewpoint partly underlay the
creation of the I. C. C. as an administrative agency to defend and protect the
rights under the Interstate Commerce
Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. Partisanship on the part of the administrative tribunals is thus to be expected. It is there

to carry out the provisions of the legislation.
Partisanship or zeal on the part of administrative tribunals in behalf of the
rights they are created to protect is as
much expected of them as zeal on the
part of judges in the defense of that
body of rights we are pleased to call our
liberties. We would oppose, for example, the appointment of judges who were
not partisan to the liberties set forth in
the Bill of Rights.
The second point upon which I would
take issue with Professor Brown is in regard to the existence of expertness on
the part of administrative tribunals as
contrasted with courts.
The average judge has for example
before him as the current of his business
divorce cases, will cases, contract cases.
He has to be an expert in innumerable
subjects. He doesn't have the opportunity that the people with the administrative agencies have to think and to spend
their time day after day, week after
week, year after year, in the effort to
solve a single problem, which alone
makes for expertness.
To take an illustration from the field
of public utility regulation, to which Professor Brown referred. The interference of the courts in the administrative
effort to establish a rate base other than
upon spot reproduction cost has, in my
judgment, bedeviled the law of public
utilities for the last twenty-five years. A
little more humility, a little appreciation
of what the problems of public utility
regulations were, would I think have led
the courts to leave the solution of that
problem in hands that were more competent to bring about a solution.
I want to move on to a consideration
of some of the features that were
brought out by some of the other speakers. The ramifications of this question
of what is a fair hearing, what are the
requirements of a hearing, seem to me
to be immense. The thing that surprises
one about it is how little law there is in
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existence on the question of what a fair
hearing must be. The few cases mentioned by Mr. Smith, the few cases mentioned by the other speakers are, in substance, about all the law that we have had
on that subject.
You take the simple problem as to
whether or not a hearing needs to precede the adoption of an order or a regulation, that in itself is a very difficult
problem. If you believe the courts who
tell you day in and day out that ratemaking is a legislative function, you
can't blame the Bituminous Coal Commission for taking them at their word
and saying, "Well, it is a legislative function; as such, no hearing need precede
it"-a perfectly rational argument, and
yet one that we know is wrong.
I think we should come to the conclusion, as Professor Fuchs suggested, that
we should get away from considering
this problem in terms of separation of
powers, and approach the thing realistically, realizing that administrative functions are not legislative functions, executive functions, quasi-legislative functions, or the like, but that they are administrative functions, and that we have
to fashion, just as other systems of justice have fashioned, modes and means of
procedure to see that justice is done in
that field.
I have very little patience with the terminology that is so frequently present in
writing on administrative law, which
tries to bring our complicated society under the doctrine which even at the time
when Montesquieu developed it was
gone. We still go on with the same language, trying, by an analogical method of
reasoning that has really very little content, to discover the answer to problems
which should be discovered by empiric
methods.
The three outstanding problems that
were discussed this afternoon raise some
of the great problems facing administrative justice. The first of these problems
relates to the fact that administrative
agencies of a large size, like the Federal
Trade Commission, the National Labor
Relations Board with 700 men, the SEC

with something around 1450 or 1500,
handle an enormous amount of work.
Mr. Madden has told us that it disposes
of about 1200 cases a year. The very
fact that there is this enormous amount
of work in the hands of these administrative agencies forces the delegation of
the function of deciding. That is the
thing that worries me as much as my aspect of the entire administrative problem.
Mr. Smith, in his remarks, said one
thing you feel about the I. C. C. is that
you-had a chance to be heard, and that is
a very important thing, this feeling that
you had a chance to talk to the man who
was going to decide your case.
President Buchanan, before he was
President, and when he was acting as
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of
the House, made this remark: "Next to
the importance of doing justice is the belief that justice is being done." You
must satisfy that requirement of the individual who comes before an administrative tribunal, that feeling that he
wants to talk to the man who is going to
decide that case. If he doesn't know
who is going to decide that case and if
he has his suspicion that it is going to
be decided by some two-pence-halfpenny
law clerk down the line, you will never
get anywhere, in my judgment, with
bringing into existence a feeling that justice is being done. But how to work
through that problem is a difficult one.
Mr. Lane has sketched for you the
procedure whereby a very busy outfit, the
Securities and Exchange Commission,
tries to dispose of its cases. I see no objection to the principle of delegating the
writing of opinions; it must be done, but
the delegating of the problem of judging
is another story. The framing of the
opinion can be left to outside hands.
But the man who decides a thing has to
have a sense of the record. He may not
have to pore over the record as a whole,
but he has to know what is in that record, what the issue is, and to reach his
own conclusion with reference to it.
In order to attain that objective, it may
be necessary to break up and decentralize the functions of some of our admin-
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istrative agencies. Here I believe there
is a field that deserves much more thorough exploration than it has yet received.
The second important topic of this afternoon, in my judgment, was the position
of the trial examiner. I have very deep
feelings about the trial examiner. The
trial examiner is a very important individual in the whole administrative proceeding. He is the person that you have
to rely upon unless you rely upon your
own counsel, which you shouldn't do, to
tell you what the facts are in that record, to focus the issue.
Moreover, he is the person whose
sense of the fitness of things carries the
reputation of the administrative agency into community after community.
Whether he disposes of his business with
dispatch or gives a sense of fairness is
important for he is the commission to
thousands of individuals. Unfortunately, it is hard to get good men for trial
examiners. Two reasons are responsible
for that, in my judgment: One is that
the job is of a routine character. You
are deciding the same thing day after
day. Another is the unfortunate factand I say unfortunate at this particular
time because of the present position taken by some of the law officers of the government that they would like to put their
legal help under the civil service-that
the Civil Service Commission, not being
able to realize that the difference between
good and bad lawyers is incapable of determination by an examination of their
paper records, lays down the requirement
in the Federal Government that you cannot pay trial examiners more than $4,600
a year. That is an example of the Civil
Service Commission's sense of astuteness with reference to this very serious
problem in administrative law.
Thirdly, a word of this combination of
functions. I think the answer to that
was made in large measure by Mr.
Smith, namely, that the evils of any such
combination of functions can be corrected by the administrative agencies themselves. You don't hear that complaint
with reference to the I. C. C. and yet in
many of the proceedings before the I. C.
C., the Commission takes a considerable

part in initiating action. You don't hear
the complaint very much with reference
to proceedings before the Securities and
Exchange Commission these days. You
heard it at the start because some of the
crooks shouted loudly along this line to
still any inquiry into their crookedness.
But the Commission now has so arranged functional division within the departments themselves that the criticism is
avoided. That it exists elsewhere, however, and that it is a serious matter, I
have no doubt is true.
When I went to the Federal Trade
Commission, I found that the findings of
that Commission were, as a matter of
practice, drafted by the Commission's attorney in the case, the prosecuting attorney. It seemed to me absolutely wrong
that that should be so. True, the Commission exercised an independent judgment before it said, "Issue an order, or
do not issue an order," but the findings
supporting that order were drafted by
the Commission's own attorney who had
presented the case. Naturally, he tied up
the respondent, so the respondent couldn't
move, with the findings he drafted.
Again and again I have seen abuses of
a similar nature. But the violations that
occur, occur as the result of an inexpert
organization within the administrative.
Whereas from another standpoint, this
combination of functions, as I intimated
before, has a very important social bearing. You need to enforce laws, especially when you have and are likely to
have changing political conceptions dominant at any particular time.
A party that comes into power wants
not only to put through its program as
a matter of legislation; it wants to put
through its program as a matter of administration. If it is helpless or is sought
to be broken as, for example, the National Labor Relations Board was sought
to be broken by an utter disregard of all
the recognized precedents in the law-I
refer to the action of the lower courts
who stepped in and enjoined the Board
even from holding hearings-when you
run into a situation of that type you
can't wait for the occurrence of a shift
in judge-made law which though it will
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eventually come may be slow in doing so.
Speaking of the lag in judge-made law,
Dicey said, "If legislative law represents
the opinion of yesterday rather than today; judge-made law, because of the
ages and training of our judges, tends to
emulate the law of day before yesterday."
That time lag in judicial law-making
is a serious matter, and that time lag is
one of the important factors for trying to
bring about a better coordination between
enforcement and policy-making.
Finally, I would make one plea. It is
this: Advance in the system of administrative procedure will come only, as I see
it, from a thorough understanding of the
individual administrative units in our
government. The time is hardly ripe today for loose generalizations about the
subject.
We are today, as I see it, in a period
where large portions of our thinking population resent administrative justice because it is something new. Professional
people resent, also, the loss of a jurisdiction that theretofore was in the hands of
the courts, especially the lawyers and the
courts. From resentment grows criticism, but to make that criticism productive, it does seem to me that we must
first have thorough understanding.
I was impressed with Mr. Smith's remarks when he spoke of a tribunal, of
which he knew, criticized it but also recognized that the tribunal gave you as

fair a guarantee of getting your rights
as other tribunals might.
Such criticisms as are launched against
administrative tribunals can, as I said
before, frequently be launched against
the means of administering justice in our
courts. I think it is important for us, in
our general consideration of this problem, to recognize that here we are at the
beginning, historically speaking, of a period because we have only had fifty years
of experience with this problem, of a new
method of trying to administer justice,
and that method criticizes, certainly impliedly criticizes, certain points in which
our thinking has been a little too complacent.
One is our dccepted belief that the socalled adversary method is the only methed of administering justice. In your administrative agencies there is a tendency
again and again to get away from the
purely adversary means of administering
justice, and, because you get away from
that method of administering justice, certain of the accepted maxims that are applicable to the adversary system have
very little play in this field.
.Consequently, to move in our thinking
from one field to another without, at the
same time, recognizing that the basic implications of the way you seek to bring
about justice have shifted, is frequently
to fail to understand what is happening
within both systems.

